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B. How Experience Informs Expert Opinion 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the familiar expert witness scene from the movie My Cousin 
Vinny.  Vinny, played by Joe Pesci, calls as a witness Mona Lisa Vito, 
played by Marisa Tomei.  Her experience as an auto mechanic is held to 
qualify her as an expert in general automotive knowledge.  The court allows 
her to testify that the set of tire tracks made by the fleeing felons’ car could 
not have been made by the defendant’s car because only a car with 
positraction could have left those tracks.  Her testimony leads to the 
dismissal of all charges.  But is she an expert?  Should she be given the 
latitude accorded an expert to base her testimony on information not 
personally known to her and to express an opinion without clarifying its 
basis for the jury?  Or is she a lay witness with an unusual experience base 
and therefore limited to conclusions rationally derived from her base of 
knowledge? 
Take an example of typical testimony offered as expert opinion in a 
prosecution for a narcotics violation.  The defendant is charged with illegal 
distribution of cocaine, but claims he is not a drug dealer.  At trial, the 
prosecution calls a law enforcement agent to testify that certain aspects of 
the defendant’s conduct were consistent with the behavior of an experienced 
drug dealer.  Specifically, the agent opines that when the defendant circled 
the parking lot before meeting with the undercover agents, he was engaging 
in counter-surveillance, that the defendant’s use of a rental car is the mark of 
an experienced drug dealer, and that, when the defendant spoke with the 
informant to set up the sale, he used the coded language of a drug dealer.  
The law enforcement witness bases these opinions on experience 
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investigating drug cases.  Is the opinion testimony admissible?  Should the 
court evaluate the evidence as expert or as lay opinion?1 
Consider experience-based testimony offered on the question of design 
defect.  The plaintiff lost his leg when he was hit by a car while riding a 
motorcycle.  He claims that the motorcycle was defectively designed 
because it did not have crash bars.  Experts dispute the efficacy of the crash 
bars used on police motorcycles.  To support his claim, the plaintiff calls a 
former police chief who has served on motorcycle patrol and has 
investigated motorcycle accidents.  The witness’s opinion is that police 
motorcycle crash bars are effective.  The witness has no scientific or 
engineering expertise in motorcycle design and limited experience with the 
type of motorcycle the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident.  
Should the court evaluate the offered testimony as expert opinion or as lay 
opinion?  Is it admissible?2 
Finding the line between expert and lay opinion testimony is not always 
easy.3  Determining where experience-based opinion falls on this spectrum 
has proven particularly challenging to the courts.  Opinion based on the 
witness’s unusual experience base does not always fit neatly into either 
category.  In some cases, the court undervalues relevant experience as a 
basis for opinion, either lay or expert.  In others, the court defers too readily 
to the claim that a witness’s experience qualifies the witness to provide an 
opinion, often treating experience as sufficient to establish expertise. 
 
 1.  This hypothetical is based on United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 
1997) (discussed infra note 179 and accompanying text).  In Figueroa-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the testimony should have been evaluated as expert opinion and excluded because the 
prosecution did not provide the required pretrial notice.  Id. at 1246. 
 2.  This hypothetical is based on Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1316–18 (5th Cir. 
1995) (discussed infra at notes 183–190 and accompanying text).  The facts of that case are detailed 
in the district court opinion, Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 758 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Miss. 1991), rev’d, 
984 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1993).  In Satcher, the Fifth Circuit held that the testimony was admissible 
expert opinion.  Satcher, 52 F.3d at 1317–18. 
 3.  See United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2004); Downeast Ventures, 
Ltd. v. Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110–11 (D. Me. 2006); Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F. 
Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006) (noting that the line between lay and expert testimony is not 
always easy to draw); State v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490, 493 (S.C. 2001) (dissent disagreeing with 
majority conclusion that officer’s testimony went beyond his expertise and arguing it was 
permissible lay opinion); 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 59 (6th 
ed. 2006) (recognizing difficulty); Brandon L. Bigelow, Summary and Expert Witnesses: A 
Distinction with a Difference, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing confusion 
that can arise at trial); Daniel J. Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses and Experts, N.Y. 
L.J., Mar. 13, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses] (discussing 
difficulty of delineating the line under pre-amendment rules); David Martinez & Bree Arlyn-Pessin, 
Undesignated Hitters, L.A. LAW., Feb. 26, 2004, at 28 (referring to the “often blurry distinction”). 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rules) were amended in 2000, 
adopting specific, more stringent requirements for expert testimony and 
hardening the line between lay and expert opinion.  Expert opinion 
testimony is now admissible only if based on reliable methodology, whereas 
lay opinion must merely be rationally derived using everyday reasoning.4  
The decisions applying these rules do not strike the right balance with regard 
to experience-based opinion.  Too often, courts allow opinion testimony 
simply because the witness has an unusual base of experience, either 
accepting a claim of experience-based expertise at face value or admitting 
experience-based opinion as lay opinion without rigorously applying the 
governing rule.  As a result, the courts admit unreliable and unwarranted 
opinion testimony and grant unqualified witnesses latitude in presenting 
opinion accorded only to experts.  This Article explains why more 
experience-based opinion should be evaluated as lay opinion, and also 
argues for increased scrutiny of such lay opinion. 
The improper admission of experience-based opinion is particularly 
problematic in criminal cases.  Law enforcement officers are routinely 
permitted to testify as experts based on their law enforcement experience.5  
 
 4.  FED. R. EVID. 701–02. 
 5.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (permitting law enforcement officer with 
specialization in obscenity cases to provide expert testimony regarding the state’s community 
standards and whether defendant was in violation of them); United States v. Vann, 336 F. App’x 944 
(11th Cir. 2009) (permitting police detective to testify as expert witness regarding drug use and 
practice); United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1989) (using a police officer to provide 
expert testimony as to whether substance in question was cocaine); United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 
385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing FBI special agent to provide expert testimony regarding “drug 
code” interpretation and jargon); Williams v. Evans, No. CV F 08-01586 LJO BAK HC, 2009 WL 
1460832, at *31–32 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (referencing long history of allowing law enforcement 
officers to testify as experts on gangs and gang activity); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 70 
n.16 (stating that expert witness knowledge may be derived from experience, and listing law 
enforcement testimony regarding the modus operandi for various crimes as exemplary of such 
experience-based knowledge); 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:2, 
at 74 n.4 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that courts commonly recognize expert testimony of law 
enforcement officers).  A number of commentators have criticized the use of law enforcement 
officers as prosecution experts in criminal cases.  See, e.g., Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous 
Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855 (1986); Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty 
Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2004) (criticizing 
courts for allowing prosecution experts to testify without scrutinizing their basis); D. Michael 
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (discussing disparity between standards applied to prosecution 
experts and those applied to defense experts).  The courts’ ready acceptance of questionable law 
enforcement expert testimony may be precipitated in part by the courts’ frequent exposure to law 
enforcement testimony in hearings on defense motions to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.  In such a hearing, evidence is relevant that should not ordinarily be admitted at trial.  For 
example, evidence concerning the law enforcement officer’s state of mind and understanding based 
on prior cases, as well as the defendant’s reputation for drug trafficking can be introduced to support 
the prosecution’s claim that the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  Similarly, an 
officer can rely on information obtained from other officers when determining whether there is 
probable cause.  See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the 
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The prosecution employs these opinion witnesses to ascribe criminal 
significance to otherwise innocent conduct.  The prosecution also uses them 
to advance and endorse inferences supporting guilt that the prosecution will 
argue to the jury at the end of the trial.  Most of this law enforcement 
testimony should not be admitted as either expert or lay opinion.  The courts 
should curtail this practice by enforcing the rules governing opinion 
testimony, with less deference given to the prosecution’s claims.6 
Courts should assess all experience-based opinion with greater care.  
When a party offers as an expert a witness who has an unusual experience 
base, the court should scrutinize the way in which the expert arrived at the 
offered inferences.  If a witness has a broad base of relevant experience, but 
brings no methodology to bear in drawing inferences, the witness’s opinion 
should be treated as lay opinion.  A witness who is merely applying 
everyday reasoning to draw inferences from the combination of the 
witness’s experience and the relevant observed facts should not be granted 
the latitude accorded an expert.  Taking this approach, courts would not 
allow a witness to give expert opinion based solely on experience without 
determining that the witness had a reliable and specialized mode of analysis, 
and had applied it to a reliable basis.  Most experience-based opinion would 
be evaluated as lay opinion and restricted accordingly. 
In addition, the rule governing lay opinion, Rule 701, should be given 
more bite.  The courts should scrutinize lay opinion to make sure that the 
witness’s knowledge supports the inferences reflected in the opinion.  Lay 
opinion must be rationally related to the witness’s perception.  Under the 
 
difference between information pertinent for probable cause and foundation necessary for admissible 
lay opinion).  Such testimony may also be admissible to explain the reasonableness of an officer’s 
actions in civil cases where a law enforcement officer is sued for damages by someone who was the 
object of police action.  See, e.g., Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998) (action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 where key question was whether officer had probable cause).  None of these 
avenues should be open to the prosecution at trial.  While strongly probative on Fourth Amendment 
questions, the evidence is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial at trial. 
 6.  The problem with the prosecution’s use of experts relates closely to the flaws in the forensic 
sciences discussed in the National Academy of Sciences Report.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE].  Law enforcement experts claim 
experience and pooled information from within the law enforcement community as a basis for 
expertise.  But the prosecution does not demonstrate the reliability of the expert opinion for the 
particular case and the particular questions addressed by the claimed expert.  See also Paul C. 
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific 
Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988) (discussing unreliability and role of subjective judgment in 
forensic analysis); Moreno, supra note 5, at 34–35 (discussing law enforcement testimony regarding 
drug jargon interpretation and noting that “there has [never] been a real effort to study or test the 
reliability of any drug jargon definitions”). 
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rule, the trial court should demand that the opinion reflect inferences that can 
fairly be drawn from the facts observed by the witness using everyday 
reasoning.  Currently, courts permit witnesses to express opinions simply 
because they possess unusual experience, without any assurance that their 
opinions satisfy these requirements.  As a result, they allow the jury to hear 
unreliable opinion testimony. 
This Article explains why more of the testimony given by experienced 
witnesses who inhabit the border between lay and expert status should be 
evaluated under the rules governing lay opinion and suggests specific 
guidelines for scrutinizing opinion testimony.  Section II outlines the law 
governing lay and expert opinion and the differentiation between the two 
types of opinion.  Section III explains why it makes a difference whether an 
opinion is evaluated as lay rather than expert.  Section IV examines the 
relationship between experience and opinion testimony, looking at the ways 
in which the witness’s experience may inform the opinion.  Section V 
highlights the risks entailed in admitting opinion testimony based solely on 
experience.  Finally, Section VI suggests five guidelines for a court 
determining the admissibility of experience-based opinion: (1) the court 
should generally determine the admissibility of the opinion under the rules 
governing lay opinion; (2) the court should be skeptical of claims that the 
witness possesses expertise based on experience and “training,” 
understanding that the combination of experience and training does not 
necessarily signal that the witness brings reliable methodology to bear on the 
facts; (3) the court should scrutinize the fit between the witness’s experience 
and the proffered opinion; (4) the court should strictly limit opinion 
testimony that draws inferences based on third party conduct; and (5) the 
court should preclude witnesses from over-generalizing based on their 
experience. 
II. OPINION TESTIMONY UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Federal Rules of Evidence devote an entire article to opinion 
testimony.  For purposes of this discussion, two rules are critical.  Rule 701 
defines the requirements for lay opinion testimony.7  Rule 702 sets the 
parameters for admitting expert testimony.8  Both rules were amended in 
2000 to demark the line between them more clearly and to assure the 
reliability of opinion evidence.9 
 
 7.  See infra Section II.A. 
 8.  See infra Section II.B. 
 9.  See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 92–95 (discussing 2000 
amendment). 
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The common law rules that predated the Federal Rules of Evidence 
restricted the use of both lay and expert opinion.10  When the Federal Rules 
of Evidence were enacted in 1975, they relaxed the restrictions on opinion 
testimony.11  For example, whereas the common law typically restricted the 
use of opinion testimony to instances in which the jury could not otherwise 
understand the evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a lower 
threshold for admitting opinion.12  Under the rules, opinion evidence can be 
 
 10.  See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1401, at 591–
605 (4th ed. 2005) (stating the common law opinion rule and discussing its criticisms); 7 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1919–22, at 14–29 (1978) (criticizing 
the opinion rule and advocating for its abandonment). 
 11.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (commenting that lay opinion should not 
be subjected to the requirement that it be necessary and that “the practical impossibility of 
determining by rule what is a ‘fact’” has created problems in the law of evidence); FED. R. EVID. 702 
advisory committee’s note (noting that the key to admissibility is simply whether the testimony will 
assist the trier of fact); see also Bamberger, supra note 5 (discussing liberalization of rules governing 
expert testimony).  Wigmore criticized the common law rules limiting the admissibility of opinion 
evidence and argued that opinion should be admitted more readily.  7 WIGMORE, supra note 10, §§ 
1919–22, at 14–29; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (discussing Wigmore and other critics); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55 
(discussing Wigmore’s position and suggesting that a number of judges already take the Wigmore 
approach).  In 1901, Learned Hand explained the rationale for and development of the rules limiting 
opinion evidence: 
The rule that a witness shall not testify to mere opinion or conclusion is such a rule, and 
its origin no doubt was, if we could trace it, due to a gradual recognition by successive 
judges of the advantage of curtailing the trial and simplifying the issue by leaving out 
redundant matter.  I call this redundant because in fact the opinion of the witness upon 
the issue can have no useful bearing on the case, and trenches on the jury’s function.  It is 
the jury that should form the opinion, make the conclusion and say truly—vere dicere—
the fact, not the witness; he merely says what he knows.  Therefore this rule of 
evidence—if in view of this it may be properly called such—is somewhat different from 
those which shut off certain facts actually probative of the issue.  Moreover, it was 
recognized comparatively early in the history of rules of evidence.  For we find Vaughan, 
C.J., that great defender of the right of juries to go “on their own knowledge,” well saying 
in Bushell’s case in 1671: “The Verdict of a Jury and Evidence of a Witness are very 
different things, in the truth and falsehood of them; a Witness swears but to what he hath 
heard or seen, generally or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses.  But a 
Juryman swears to what he can inferr and conclude from the Testimony of such 
Witnesses by the act and force of the Understanding, to be the Fact inquired after, which 
differs nothing in the Reason, though much in the punishment, from what a Judge, out of 
various Cases consider’d by him, inferrs to be the Law in the Question before him.”  The 
distinction cannot be put more plainly. 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. 
REV. 40, 44–45 (1901) (footnote omitted); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After 
Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of 
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2274–76 (1994) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried, The Next Step] (discussing common law limitations on opinion testimony). 
 12.  The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 701 comment that “necessity as a standard for 
permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too elusive and too unadaptable to particular 
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admitted even when the jury could resolve the issues without the assistance 
of opinion.13 
The common law also imposed additional restrictions if expert 
testimony represented new technology or science.14  Key Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1990s changed that approach to expert testimony, requiring 
the trial court to assess the reliability of the expert’s approach before 
admitting expert testimony.15  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.16 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,17 the Court reformulated the test 
 
situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial administration.”  1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, 
at 53–54 (discussing evolution away from necessity requirement); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra 
note 10, § 1401, at 591–94 (discussing evolution of the law); see also Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1195–98 
(discussing move from common law to rules); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at 
the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About 
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994) (discussing evolution of rules 
from common law to Daubert); D. Garrison Hill, Lay Witness Opinions, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 
36 (discussing South Carolina pre-rule law, which permitted opinion only if it was the sole way the 
facts could be proven).  But see Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2271 (suggesting that 
lay opinion is admissible only if the witness cannot otherwise convey the information). 
 13.  Rule 701 allows lay opinion if it will help the jury, and Rule 702 allows expert opinion if it 
will assist the jury.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (stating that Rule 701 “codifies 
‘convenience’ as the standard” for lay opinion, rather than requiring strict necessity); 1 
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 595–96 (noting that, in adopting the “helpfulness” 
standard for lay opinion testimony, the federal drafters “explicitly rejected ‘necessity’ as the 
standard”); Matthew J. Rita, Rule 701: Admissibility of Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, 26 
COLO. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 63 (suggesting that lay opinion is admissible even if the jury could 
resolve the case without it). 
 14.  Novel scientific evidence was subjected to the general acceptance test, established in Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923): 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental 
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the 
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 
Id.; see also 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 606, at 200.  Under the general acceptance 
test, the trial court did not have to assess the expert’s approach for reliability, but instead turned to 
the relevant discipline to determine the acceptance of the methodology. 
 15.  See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert 
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 52 
ME. L. REV. 19, 20–23 (2000) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability] (discussing 
evolution of the law). 
 16.  509 U.S. 579 (1993).  See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 613–16, at 
219–34 (discussing the relevance and application of Daubert); THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D. 
WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 2.3, at 16–17 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the new emphasis given the 
“gatekeeper” function of federal judges following Daubert); David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, 
Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 467–72 
(2008) [hereinafter Bernstein, Expert Witnesses] (describing the development of courts’ gatekeeping 
role); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 720–23 (1998) (discussing 
gatekeeping role established by Daubert); Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1811–22 (discussing 
Daubert). 
 17.  526 U.S. 137 (1999).  See Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: 
Determining “Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended 
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for admitting expert testimony.  It concluded that the Federal Rules did not 
codify the general acceptance test.18  Instead, the Court read Rule 702 as 
requiring that expert testimony be reliable and imposing the role of 
gatekeeper on the courts.19  In the wake of these decisions, there were heated 
debates about how the courts should assess reliability and what types of 
evidence were subject to the reliability assessment.20 
The amendments to the rules on lay and expert opinion in 2000 
responded to these decisions and the ensuing debate.  The amendments 
codified the reliability assessment for expert testimony, mandated that all 
expert testimony be subjected to reliability assessment, and also established 
a clearer line between expert and lay opinion testimony.  The rules protect 
against unreliable opinion testimony, whether lay or expert, and give the 
court a significant role in assuring the quality of the evidence admitted in 
each of the categories.21  The court should check the reliability of the way in 
which the witness derived the opinion,22 and should also make sure that the 
 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 332–36 (2000) (discussing 
Kumho); Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability, supra note 15, at 24–30 (discussing Kumho). 
 18.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see Graham, supra note 17, at 318–19 (discussing Daubert). 
 19.  See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the court’s 
gatekeeping function); see also STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 90–92 
(discussing Daubert and Kumho); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 467–72 (describing 
development of courts’ gatekeeping role); Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 720–23 
(discussing gatekeeping role established by Daubert); Jennifer Laser, Comment, Inconsistent 
Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to 
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1379 (1997) (discussing Daubert before 
Kumho was decided).  The rule is arguably applied differently in criminal cases.  Moreno, supra note 
5, at 14–18 (suggesting that Daubert has had far less impact in criminal cases). 
 20.  See Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1246–48 (M.D. La. 1996) 
(discussing debate and citing cases); see also Walter G. Amstutz & Bobby Marzine Harges, 
Evolution of Controversy: The Daubert Dilemma: The Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. to Expert Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers in Narcotics-Related Cases, 
23 U. HAW. L. REV. 67, 78–84 (2000) (discussing debate); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by 
Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 80 (1998) 
(discussing disagreement concerning which types of evidence are subject to Daubert analysis); 
Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 738–51 (discussing applicability of Daubert to non-
scientific expert opinion); K. Issac deVyver, Comment, Opening the Door but Keeping the Lights 
Off: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific 
Evidence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 183–85 (1999) (explaining the strong disagreement among 
circuits, judges, and legal commentators about the scope of Daubert and its applicability to 
nonscientific evidence); Laser, supra note 19, at 1389 (discussing debate). 
 21.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (recognizing courts’ gatekeeper role); see 
also Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing courts’ 
gatekeeping role for expert and lay opinion prior to amendment of rules). 
 22.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (recognizing the importance of assurance 
of reliability). 
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opinion is presented in a manner that permits the jurors to fairly evaluate it.23  
In the subsections that follow, this Article outlines the rules governing lay 
and expert opinion and defines the line between the two types of opinion. 
A. Lay Opinion—Rule 701 
Rule 701 governs lay opinion.  The rule provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’[s] 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of 
the witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702.24 
The rule defines four hurdles that lay opinion must clear to gain 
admission: (1) the witness must speak from personal knowledge; (2) the 
inferences reflected in the opinion must be rationally based on that 
knowledge; (3) the opinion must be helpful to the jury; and (4) the opinion 
cannot be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.25  
Thus, every lay opinion rests on a combination of the witness’s experience 
base, information known to the witness, and a process of rational reasoning.  
The assurance of reliability lies in these first three requirements.  The fourth 
requirement was added to the rule in 2000 in an effort to better demark the 
line between expert and lay testimony.26  The court’s job when ruling on the 
admissibility of lay opinion is to ensure that the opinion rests on a base of 
personal knowledge and experience and is fairly derived from that base with 
everyday reasoning. 
Much of the routinely admissible lay testimony combines opinion and 
non-opinion testimony, and in many instances, that distinction is 
inconsequential.27  For example, lay testimony as to someone’s age, size, or 
behavior involves both factual observation and opinion, but the court need 
not decide which aspects of the testimony are fact and which are opinion.  
Such routine lay opinion easily clears the hurdles established by the rule, 
 
 23.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (stressing that jurors should get sufficient 
information to evaluate opinion); see also Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 705 (noting 
the importance of providing opinion in a form that the trier of fact can evaluate). 
 24.  FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 27.  See generally Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (3d Cir. 
1995) (discussing the common law rule and criticism and development of federal rule); 1 BROUN ET 
AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 53 (discussing Wigmore). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:30 PM 
[Vol. 39: 551, 2012] Experience-Based Opinion Testimony 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
561 
provided the witness speaks with personal knowledge or does not draw a 
patently unwarranted inference.28 
However, lay opinion is not always so routine.  A witness with unusual 
experience may be permitted to testify to a lay opinion based on that 
experience.29  The concern with admitting lay opinion increases when the 
opinion goes beyond routine information and expresses a more sophisticated 
judgment pertinent to the case.  If the court does not assure that the lay 
opinion satisfies the requirements of the rule—that the witness has an 
adequate basis in personal knowledge and is within the bounds of rational 
inference—lay opinion may become a vehicle by which inadmissible 
evidence is veiled and then presented to the jury.30  Lay opinion that does 
not satisfy the rule’s requirements may inject unreliable inferences, 
inadmissible hearsay or character evidence, or evidence that would normally 
be excluded under Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial into the testimony.  
Careful enforcement of the rule’s requirements should avoid this hazard. 
 
 28.  United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing admissibility of lay 
opinion on question of apparent age).  In the Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment of 
Rule 701, the committee stated: 
The amendment is not intended to affect the “prototypical example[s] of the type of 
evidence contemplated by the adoption of Rule 701 relat[ing] to the appearance of 
persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, competency of a person, degrees of 
light or darkness, sound, size, weight, distance, and an endless number of items that 
cannot be described factually in words apart from inferences.” 
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (quoting Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1196). 
 29.  See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing former gang member 
to decode conversations for the jury); Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1198–201 (discussing examples); United 
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 156–57 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting a drug user to testify as a lay 
witness that white powder “looked and tasted” like cocaine, and noting that lay witnesses may testify 
to subjects outside “the realm of common knowledge” based on the witness’s individual experience); 
see also 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604 (suggesting that witnesses with 
experience beyond common knowledge may be permitted to testify as lay witnesses rather than 
expert witnesses); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§ 10.02[2][c], at 10-14 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2011) (noting that, even after the 2000 
amendment to Rule 701, a witness who uses the processes of ordinary persons to form opinions 
based on particularized experience and knowledge may testify as a lay witness).  But see G. Michael 
Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 939, 975–77 (1996) (discussing Asplundh); Graham, supra note 17, at 326 n.30 (2000) 
(discussing Asplundh and arguing that the experienced witness should be treated as an expert). 
 30.  See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing witness’s 
reliance on information gathered by other law enforcement agents). 
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1. Based on the Perception of the Witness 
The lay opinion rule requires that a lay opinion be based “on the 
perception of the witness.”31  This reflects a particular emphasis on the 
personal knowledge requirement that is implicit throughout the Rules of 
Evidence.32  A witness who rests her opinion on information from others in 
addition to her own observations does not comport with the requirements for 
lay opinion.33  Whereas an expert can rely on vicarious experience and 
relayed information, a witness providing lay opinion can call only on 
personal experience and personally observed facts.34 
 
 31.  Id. at 211 (emphasis added) (discussing the personal perception requirement).  The Second 
Circuit emphasized that “lay opinion [is] an acceptable ‘shorthand’ for the ‘rendition of facts that the 
witness personally perceived.’”  Id. (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 701.03[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2004)).  In 
Garcia, the court used the following example of acceptable shorthand: 
To illustrate: when an undercover agent participates in a hand-to-hand drug exchange 
with a number of persons, the agent may well testify that, in his opinion, a particular 
participant, “X,” was the person directing the transaction.  Such an opinion is based on 
his personal perception of such subjective factors as the respect various participants 
showed “X,” their deference to “X” when he spoke, and their consummation of the deal 
only upon a subtly signaled approval by “X.”  By allowing the agent to state his opinion 
as to a person’s role in such circumstances, Rule 701 affords the jury an insight into an 
event that was uniquely available to an eyewitness.  In this respect, the rule recognizes 
the common sense behind the saying that, sometimes, “you had to be there.” 
Id. at 211–12; see also Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that 
“perceptions” include the witness’s interpretation of personal sensory experience); 1 BROUN ET AL., 
supra note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30 (stating that the perception requirement “mandates that the opinion be 
one which a lay person could normally form from observed facts”); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra 
note 10, § 1401, at 595 (discussing the perception condition and noting that it refers to the firsthand 
knowledge requirement that is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 602). 
 32.  See Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing and 
implementing personal knowledge requirement of Rule 701); United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 
67 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that witness lacked basis in personal knowledge to give opinion that 
bulge in defendant’s pants, observed from some distance, was caused by a gun); Gorby v. Schneider 
Tank Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that lay opinion was properly excluded 
because witness lacked sufficient firsthand knowledge).  McCormick emphasizes that the original 
common law restriction on lay opinion was based in a concern that the witness not speak without 
personal knowledge.  1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 51–52.  Federal Rule of Evidence 602 
imposes a personal knowledge requirement on all witnesses except those who testify as experts.  
FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 33.  See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211 (holding lay testimony based on information and opinion 
gathered by numerous officers in the course of an investigation to be inadmissible under Rule 701’s 
perception requirement); TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting lay opinion testimony by a project manager based on reports from his staff); 1 BROUN ET 
AL., supra note 3, § 10, at 48 (noting that testimony which rests on statements of others lacks the 
requisite firsthand knowledge requirement); 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 11 n.2 (noting that 
a lay witness offering an opinion must base that opinion on the witness’s “own personal 
knowledge”). 
 34.  See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211; Bank of China v. NBM LLC, 359 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(noting that testimony not based on the witness’s perception should not have been admitted as lay 
testimony); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the 
Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185, 203 (2000) [hereinafter 
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2. Rationally Based on the Witness’s Perception 
The rule further requires that lay opinion be “rationally based” on the 
witness’s perception.35  The court’s job when applying this requirement of 
the rule is to ensure that the opinion expressed by the witness is one that can 
be drawn from the witness’s knowledge base using ordinary reasoning.36  If 
the witness’s opinion represents too great a leap from the witness’s 
knowledge base, the court should exclude it as not rationally based.37 
3. Helpful 
The rule also requires that a lay opinion be “helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in 
 
Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony].  Professor Imwinkelried points out that a key distinction 
between expert and lay opinion lies in the permissible basis for the opinion.  See generally infra 
Section III (discussing significance of difference between lay and expert opinion). 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 701 (emphasis added).  In United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 
1246 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit assumed that scrutiny under the lay opinion rule was limited 
to an assurance that the witness had observed the facts—“mere percipience”—and overlooked the 
requirement that the opinion be rationally based on the witness’s perception. 
 36.  The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment states: 
The amendment incorporates the distinctions set forth in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 
530, 549 (1992), a case involving former Tennessee Rule of Evidence 701, a rule that 
precluded lay witness testimony based on “special knowledge.”  In Brown, the court 
declared that the distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay 
testimony “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” while expert 
testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists 
in the field.” 
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 119 
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting that courts should ensure that opinion is rationally derived from witness’s 
observation); Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(emphasizing role of requirement that lay opinion be rationally based on witness’s perception).  
Some commentators ascribe no independent significance to the rational relation requirement, but 
simply treat it as part of the personal knowledge requirement.  See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra 
note 10, § 1401, at 595 (discussing requirements for admissibility of lay opinion); see also Bigelow, 
supra note 3, at 4–5 (discussing Asplundh); Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra 
note 3, at 34 (discussing Asplundh and characterizing this approach as injecting the Daubert 
gatekeeping function into Rule 701). 
 37.  Professor Imwinkelried captured this notion in his discussion of how a court should 
approach the testimony of a witness who offers an opinion regarding habit.  Imwinkelried, The Next 
Step, supra note 11, at 2293–94.  Professor Imwinkelried suggested that the trial judge can assess the 
similarity of the observed behavior that provides the basis for the witness’s opinion on habit.  Id. at 
2294 (“If the judge’s common sense and intuition tell her that the experiences are not at all parallel, 
the inference is acceptable neither as a matter of law nor as a matter of epistemology.”).  Thus, he 
called for the judge’s assessment that the opinion can be rationally derived from the witness’s 
experience/personal knowledge base.  Id. 
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issue.”38  In some cases, the witness uses lay opinion to express information 
that cannot be conveyed through a bare factual account.39  Even when the 
witness can convey the facts without providing opinion testimony, lay 
opinion may enrich understanding by adding depth and clarity to the 
witness’s account.40 
Nevertheless, an opinion is not helpful if it simply tells the jury what 
inferences to draw41 or summarizes the party’s case.42  The concern that the 
witness threatens the province of the fact finder may likewise lead to the 
conclusion that the opinion is not helpful.43  For example, a witness who 
opines that the defendant was a partner in a drug distribution, based on the 
witness’s conclusions from recorded phone calls and other information 
gathered in a criminal investigation, supplants the jury’s function of 
determining the defendant’s culpability.44 
Similarly, if the witness’s opinion merely applies everyday reasoning to 
evidence equally available to the jury, the court may deem the opinion 
unhelpful.  For example, if the witness simply compares the defendant’s 
appearance with a surveillance photo and opines that the defendant is the 
person in the photograph, the court may reject the testimony as unhelpful 
because the witness is no better equipped than the jury to draw that 
conclusion.45 
 
 38.  FED. R. EVID. 701(b); see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (suggesting that 
“value to the jury” is the “principal test” under the Rules); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 
1401, at 595–96 (discussing helpfulness assessment). 
 39.  Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629–30 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the trial 
court should not have excluded eyewitness testimony that a gun was fired accidentally, even though 
it was “difficult . . . to articulate all of the factors that lead one to conclude a person did not intend to 
fire a gun,” because the eyewitness testimony would have been helpful to the jury). 
 40.  Id. at 630. 
 41.  United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 749–51 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that lay opinion 
testimony admitted at trial was improper because it merely told the jury what result to reach); see 
also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 12, at 61 n.12 (citing cases rejecting lay opinion on ultimate 
issue as unhelpful). 
 42.  United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding case agent’s summary 
of the evidence in the case is not an admissible, helpful lay opinion).  The Garcia court noted that 
the agent’s summary replicated the role of the prosecution’s opening statement.  Id.  But see 
Bigelow, supra note 3, at 5–8 (discussing use of summary witnesses). 
 43.  See, e.g., United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding agent’s 
testimony was not helpful because it usurped the role of the jury); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210–11 
(emphasizing the need to protect the province of the jury, and the role of Rule 701’s foundation 
requirements in protecting that province); Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750 (noting that agent’s testimony 
concerning phone calls usurped the jury’s function); United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 
(9th Cir. 1993) (expressing concern that testimony may have invaded province of jury); Hand, supra 
note 11, at 52. 
 44.  See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210–11. 
 45.  See discussion infra Section III.  For example, an expert can express an opinion that a non-
expert would not be permitted to draw.  The expert can base that opinion on information that has not 
been admitted, and is even inadmissible.  See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465 (holding that police officer 
should not have been permitted to give lay opinion that defendant was same person as person in 
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4.  Not Based on Scientific, Technical, or Other Specialized 
Knowledge 
In 2000, Rule 701 was amended to stipulate that lay opinion must not be 
based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.  The 
amendment was intended to harden the division between lay opinion and 
expert opinion, and to ensure that all opinion based on scientific, technical or 
other specialized knowledge would be subject to the reliability requirements 
of Rule 702.46  This aspect of the Rules is discussed further in the sections 
that follow. 
B. Expert Testimony—Rule 702 
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit expert witnesses to testify in 
ways that non-expert witnesses cannot.47  Before the court accords a witness 
that latitude, it must ensure that the witness satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 702. 
Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles 
 
photograph).  But see United States v. Martin, 262 F. App’x 392 (3d Cir. 2008) (allowing similar lay 
opinion testimony); Rita, supra note 13, at 64 (concluding that lay witness can sometimes testify 
concerning identity of person in photo). 
 46.  The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendment comment that “Rule 701 has been 
amended to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded 
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.”  FED. R. EVID. 701 
advisory committee’s note; see also Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 227–28 (3d Cir. 
2008) (discussing purpose of amendment); Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar 
Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (commenting that the amendment to Rule 701 
was intended to eliminate uses of Rule 701 to avoid reliability requirements of Rule 702); see also 
Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing reasons for 
amendment of Rule 701). 
 47.  See FED. R. EVID. 702–03.  As the comment to the Rules reflects, expert witnesses can also 
provide helpful non-opinion testimony.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (noting 
additional role of expert beyond mere opinion testimony); see also John William Strong, Language 
and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, 
and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 360 (1992) (describing possible roles expert may play). 
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and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case.48 
The rule as originally drafted demanded only that the expert’s testimony 
“assist” the trier of fact.49  While the expert’s testimony still need not be 
necessary to the resolution of the case in order to be admissible,50 the rule 
now also requires assurance that the testimony is reliable.  The 2000 
amendment to Rule 702 incorporated the three specific requirements 
intended to assure the reliability of expert testimony—the requirements of 
sufficient facts or data; reliable principles and methods; and reliable 
application.51 
The amendment contemplates that the expert has employed reliable 
methodology—something beyond everyday reasoning—to draw inferences 
from the information base.52  A number of pre-amendment decisions clarify 
the requirements for expert testimony.  Both Daubert and Kumho Tire 
addressed the question of what qualifies as knowledge and stressed the role 
of methodology.53  In Daubert, the Court asked what qualified as “scientific 
knowledge” admissible as expert testimony under the pre-amendment 
rules.54  The Court concluded that the way in which “knowledge” was 
derived was critical to whether it qualified as “scientific knowledge.”55  In 
 
 48.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 49.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 50.  1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1404, at 612–13 (discussing Rule 702’s 
requirement that expert testimony “assist the trier of fact,” and noting that the standard is more 
liberal than the common law, which often required that the subject of expert testimony be “beyond 
the comprehension of a layman”); Strong, supra note 47, at 354, 356 (discussing requirements). 
 51.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 52.  See LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying 
criteria and concluding that witness did not satisfy requirements of rule); see also Brian Leiter, The 
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good 
Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 815–17 (discussing limitations of judges as arbiters 
of scientific reliability); Strong, supra note 47, at 354–56 (emphasizing role of expert in providing 
reliable information both as a “check on jury notice of unreliable propositions” and as a source of 
“evaluational or computational accuracy” beyond the jury’s capability). 
 53.  Neither Daubert nor Kumho involved arguable lay opinion; both decisions addressed only 
the reliability requirements for expert testimony.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
153 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993). 
 54.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584–85. 
 55.  Id. at 590.  The Court explained: 
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.  
Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation.  The term “applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas 
inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.”  Of course, it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a 
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.  But, in order to qualify as 
“scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific 
method.  Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good 
grounds,” based on what is known.  In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony 
pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 
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Kumho Tire, the Court recognized that an expert’s experience can play a role 
in the testimony.56  The Court further emphasized that the experience of the 
discipline may play a role in establishing the reliability of expert 
testimony.57 
In addition, of course, the witness must qualify as an expert.  To do so, 
the witness must possess scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge.  The threshold for expertise was traditionally low.58  The 
addition of the three reliability factors may have also increased the 
requirements to qualify as an expert.59  Under the amended rule, the expert 
witness must now be competent to apply reliable principles and methods and 
to do so reliably.60  It will not be enough for the witness merely to have 
some knowledge beyond that of the average juror. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 56.  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148–49.  The Court explained: 
[W]hether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized observations, the 
specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the 
application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s testimony often will rest 
“upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury’s] own.”  The trial judge’s 
effort to assure that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury 
evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge. 
Id. at 149 (quoting Hand, supra note 11, at 54). 
 57.  The Court stated: “And where such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or 
their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether the 
testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’”  Id. 
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). 
 58.  The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 702 states: 
The rule is broadly phrased.  The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not 
limited merely to the “scientific” and “technical” but extend to all “specialized” 
knowledge.  Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person 
qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.”  Thus within the scope 
of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, 
physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, 
such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849 
(3d Cir. 1995) (applying traditional low standard); Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 664 A.2d 525, 
528 (Pa. 1995) (stating that the standard for qualification of expert witness is liberal, and stating that 
the test is whether the witness has “any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the 
subject”); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 86; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 556, at 751. 
 59.  McCormick cites “an incipient trend to toughen standards” in jurisdictions that have adopted 
Daubert.  1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 71; see also LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 
374 F.3d 917, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring qualifications that equip witness to satisfy 
reliability requirements); Moreno, supra note 5, at 12–14 (discussing amendment). 
 60.  See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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C. Delineating the Difference 
The comments to the Rules acknowledge that a witness with a deep 
experience base may provide a lay opinion,61 and also that a witness may 
qualify to give expert opinion solely through experience.62  Thus, 
experience-based opinion may fall under either Rule 701 or Rule 702.  When 
a party seeks to elicit opinion testimony based on experience, the court must 
determine which rule applies. 
The line between lay and expert opinion has never been clearly drawn.63  
Traditionally, there has always been an area of overlap between the two.64  
 
 61.  The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 701 remarks: 
[M]ost courts have permitted the owner or officer of a business to testify to the value or 
projected profits of the business[,] without the necessity of qualifying the witness as an 
accountant, appraiser, or similar expert.  Such opinion testimony is admitted not because 
of experience, training or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but 
because of the particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her 
position in the business.  The amendment does not purport to change this analysis.  
Similarly, courts have permitted lay witnesses to testify that a substance appeared to be a 
narcotic, so long as a foundation of familiarity with the substance is established.  Such 
testimony is not based on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, but rather 
is based upon a layperson’s personal knowledge. 
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (citations omitted). 
 62.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.  The Advisory Committee Note to the 
2000 amendment of Rule 702 states: 
Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone—or experience in 
conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education—may not provide a 
sufficient foundation for expert testimony.  To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 
expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience.  In 
certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable 
expert testimony. 
Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in 
admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical experience and 
extensive training, and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) (design engineer’s testimony can be admissible when the 
expert’s opinions “are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional 
technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the information and 
procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156 (stating 
that “no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on 
extensive and specialized experience”). 
 63.  See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 159 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the Federal 
Rules blurred distinctions between lay and expert opinion); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 
528–29 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding that witness with extensive experience could provide either lay 
or expert opinion); see also United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002) (discussing 
line between lay and expert opinion in relation to horizontal gaze nystagmus test); State v. 
Blackwell, 971 A.2d 296, 303–05 (Md. 2009) (discussing same). 
  It is worth noting that the line does not depend on categorization of the witness.  The same 
witness may provide some testimony as an expert and other testimony as a lay witness.  See United 
States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 403 (6th Cir. 2007) (commenting that the Rules “distinguish between 
lay and expert testimony, not witnesses”); United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 
2005); Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v. Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110–11 (D. Me. 2006); 
Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006).  Moreover, the fact that the 
witness could qualify as an expert does not foreclose the witness from giving lay opinion testimony.  
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However, when the Federal Rules were amended to define the lay-expert 
line more clearly and to subject expert opinion to reliability testing, 
delineating the difference between the two categories of opinion became 
critical.  The amendments raised the bar for expert testimony, while also 
seeking to eliminate the risk that expert opinion would fly under that 
reliability radar and be admitted as lay opinion.65  The Rules define the key 
question as whether the opinion rests on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.66 
Evaluating opinion testimony based on experience raises particular 
questions: What constitutes the “specialized knowledge” that requires an 
opinion to be handled as expert testimony under Rule 702 and what level of 
special background or experience base is consistent with providing lay 
opinion under Rule 701?  Does the knowledge derived from an especially 
rich experience base constitute “specialized knowledge” that forces the court 
to evaluate the evidence under the reliability requirements of Rule 702?  The 
courts must differentiate between a lay opinion that rests on an unusually 
rich experience base and an expert opinion based on experience.  The courts 
should not categorize an opinion as expert merely because the witness 
 
See Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980) (fact that accountant-
witness might have qualified as expert did not prevent witness from giving lay opinion concerning 
lost profits).  Thus, whether a given opinion is lay or expert depends on the basis and development of 
the particular opinion. 
 64.  1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 603–04 (discussing overlap); Capra, The 
Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 768 (summarizing courts’ approach to overlap). 
 65.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 
201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of this final foundation requirement is to prevent a party from 
conflating expert and lay opinion testimony thereby conferring an aura of expertise on a witness 
without satisfying the reliability standard for expert testimony . . . .”); Bank of China v. NBM LLC, 
359 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Advisory Committee Note that amendment of Rule 701 is 
intended “to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded 
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing” and concluding that the 
trial court had improperly allowed that to happen); Falconer, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (“The 
amendments to Rule 701 were designed to prevent ‘proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.’”); 4 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, § 701.03[4][b], at 701-30 (explaining that “[t]he purposes of 
the amendment are twofold.  First, it ensures that evidence qualifying as expert testimony under Rule 
702 will not evade the reliability scrutiny mandated by the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision and 
the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 . . . .  Second, it also provides assurance that parties will not use 
Rule 701 to evade the expert witness pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.” (footnotes omitted)); Martinez & Arlyn-
Pessin, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing purpose of amendment).  Before the Rules were amended to 
incorporate the reliability requirements, a debate raged concerning the application of the requirement 
to nonscientific evidence.  See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604–05 
(discussing amendment); Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2283–90 (discussing 
application of Daubert factors to nonscientific expert testimony). 
 66.  See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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possesses an unusual level of experience.  Only the application of a reliable 
methodology—a proven analytical approach beyond mere everyday 
reasoning—should qualify an opinion as expert rather than lay.67 
III. THE LINE BETWEEN LAY AND EXPERT OPINION:  
WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
Each type of opinion offers advantages and disadvantages to the 
proponent.68  The key differences are explored below.  Section A examines 
the way in which courts should approach opinion testimony depending on 
whether it is lay or expert.  Section B considers the difference in the factual 
basis required for each type of opinion.  Section C discusses the information 
required to be disclosed to the court and the jury.  Section D focuses on the 
form of the opinion testimony.  Section E describes the pretrial discovery 
obligation that attaches to expert opinion and not to lay opinion.  Finally, 
Section F notes the deference accorded expert opinion. 
A. Evaluation of the Opinion 
The two types of opinion require quite different judicial scrutiny.  The 
court’s competence to scrutinize lay opinion is greater because it rests on 
ordinary reasoning and not on the application of a specialized methodology.  
For lay opinion, the trial court must ensure that the opinion is helpful to the 
jury and reflects reasonable inferences.  To do so, the court must determine 
whether the witness could fairly draw the inferences by applying everyday 
reasoning to the facts the witness knows in the case and the witness’s 
experience base. 
In contrast, if the witness offers expert opinion, the court must scrutinize 
the witness’s claim to reliability by evaluating the methodology, the 
sufficiency of the basis, and the application of the methodology.  The court 
must also determine whether the expert opinion will assist the jury.  Thus, 
while the court does not need to rise to the level of the expert and is not 
invited to assess the reasonableness of the specific inferences, it must check 
that the parameters assuring reliability are met.69 
 
 67.  See Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A 
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 146–47 (2003) (discussing the requirement of 
validity and suggesting that the question is whether those in the field of expertise have the tools to 
produce valid answers). 
 68.  See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604 (noting the consequences of 
classification of opinion). 
 69.  See Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 80 (“The ‘gatekeeper’ function finds description in 
Daubert, but it finds its source in Rule 702.  Rule 702 makes the trial judge no less the gatekeeper 
when counsel characterizes proffered expert testimony as ‘technical’ or ‘specialized,’ rather than 
‘scientific.’” (quoting United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1997) (Jenkins, J., 
concurring))); Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 65 (“The most important mandate of Daubert is 
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B. Basis of the Opinion 
The requisite basis for the opinion also depends on how the opinion is 
classified.  Lay opinion must rest on facts observed by the witness.  As a 
result, the witness testifying to lay opinion cannot consider any information 
outside her realm of personal knowledge.70 
In contrast, an expert witness can base an opinion on information that is 
not within her personal knowledge and is not presented in court.71  The 
expert can base her testimony on data that is conveyed to her rather than 
observed by her, if the information is of the type relied upon by experts in 
the particular field.72  Further, the information need not be admitted and may 
form the basis of the opinion even if it is not admissible.73  For example, a 
physician testifying about the permanence of the plaintiff’s injury may rely 
on the results of tests that are not admitted in evidence.74  Thus, an expert 
 
that judges must actively evaluate proposed expert testimony.”); Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra 
note 16, at 735–38 (noting that the judge need not become a super-expert); Jeffrey M. Schumm, 
Precious Little Guidance to the “Gatekeepers” Regarding Admissibility of Nonscientific Evidence: 
An Analysis of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2000) (arguing 
that as gatekeepers, federal judges may assess reliability as they see fit); Laser, supra note 19, at 
1411 (noting the benefits of the court’s gatekeeping role, particularly the relief it offers the jury from 
“weighing the credibility of highly specialized expert evidence,” and opining that because judges 
must examine a witness’s methodology, expert witnesses will not be able to testify based only on 
their credentials); Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2146 
(2003) (explaining how the gatekeeping role of the courts has grown between Daubert and Kumho).  
The Supreme Court emphasized that, as gatekeepers, judges must examine “the particular 
circumstances of each case to determine whether the factors are reasonable measures of reliability.”  
Schumm, supra, at 873 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).  The 
gatekeeping role of the judge, if “overly restrictive,” may negatively affect the role of the jury, 
especially when the expert testimony is nonscientific.  Id. at 890–91 (noting that, because the 
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony is not externally tested, the jury is “just as qualified” as 
the judge to evaluate, and warning that a rigorous application of the gatekeeping function by the 
judge may lead to the judge taking on the role of the jury).  The gatekeeping function “should not 
expand the trial judge’s role, but rather assist the jury in fulfilling its responsibility.”  Id. at 891. 
 70.  See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that lay 
opinion could not rest on facts not known to the witness and that lay opinion witness could not 
testify to hearsay statements that provided basis for opinion). 
 71.  See FED. R. EVID. 703, 705; see also United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 
2008) (discussing line between permissible and impermissible basis for expert opinion); Fenner, 
supra note 29, at 978 (noting that experts can base their opinions on inadmissible evidence whereas 
lay witnesses cannot); Gross & Mnookin, supra note 67, at 145–46 (discussing difference in basis). 
 72.  See Fenner, supra note 29, at 978. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 15, at 92 (stating that “an expert may give an opinion 
based on facts and data” that are not admissible in evidence if “‘of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 703)).  The Advisory Committee Note 
accompanying Rule 703 comments: 
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can draw on a wider range of information than a lay witness in the process of 
forming an opinion. 
C. Disclosure of the Basis to the Court and Jury 
The party presenting expert or lay opinion has two disclosure 
obligations.  First, the party must provide enough information to the court to 
persuade it that the opinion is admissible.75  Second, the party must present 
enough information to the jurors to enable them to understand and evaluate 
the opinion.  The jury does not necessarily hear all the information provided 
to the judge to inform the evidentiary ruling.  The extent of the disclosure 
obligations to both judge and jury depends on how the opinion is classified. 
1.   Disclosure to the Court 
The proponent of expert testimony must provide extensive information 
to the court.  When a witness testifies as an expert under Rule 702, the court 
has a substantial gatekeeper role.76  Before the jury is allowed to hear the 
expert testimony, the court must determine that the expert has proper 
qualifications, is using a reliable methodology appropriately, and is applying 
it to an adequate basis.77  This assessment requires the proponent to inform 
the court in some detail of the basis of the opinion and the process by which 
it was reached.78  Without that detailed information, the court cannot 
determine whether the expert witness has employed reliable methodology 
and applied it reliably to a sufficient basis.79 
 
The third source [of facts or data upon which expert opinions are based] contemplated by 
the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by 
his own perception.  In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert 
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into 
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.  Thus a physician in 
his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of 
considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions 
from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. . . .  His 
validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for 
judicial purposes. 
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
 75.  See FED. R. EVID. 104; Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability, supra note 15, at 30–32 
(discussing Rule 104). 
 76.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 77.  See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 78.  See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note. 
 79.  The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 705 comments: 
If a serious question is raised under Rule 702 or 703 as to the admissibility of expert 
testimony, disclosure of the underlying facts or data on which opinions are based may, of 
course, be needed by the court before deciding whether, and to what extent, the person 
should be allowed to testify. 
Id. 
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In contrast, the proponent of a lay opinion must provide the court with 
sufficient information to determine not only that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the facts that form the basis for the opinion, but also that the 
opinion is rationally related to those facts and that it is helpful to the jury.  
Rule 701 directs the judge to assure herself that the witness’s inferences are 
reasonably derived from the witness’s personal knowledge using only 
ordinary reasoning processes.80  The judge cannot make that assessment 
without knowing the witness’s knowledge and experience base. 
2.   Disclosure to the Jury 
The jurors do not determine admissibility of evidence.  Instead, they 
assess its weight, ultimately deciding whether they are persuaded by all the 
evidence introduced at trial to find in favor of the party with the burden of 
persuasion.  As a result, the party offering evidence does not normally 
disclose to the jury all the information necessary for the judge to rule on 
admissibility.  Indeed, some of that information may be inadmissible.81 
Although the party presenting an expert opinion must provide the court 
with extensive information, the party does not ordinarily reveal the basis of 
the opinion to the jury.  The Rules both exempt and circumscribe the expert 
from disclosing the basis of her opinion to the jury.  The expert need not tell 
the fact finder about the basis for an opinion as a prerequisite to expressing 
that opinion.82  The proponent may elect to have the witness explain the 
basis of the opinion to some degree.  However, the Rules limit the extent to 
which the expert can relay information on which the opinion is based, but 
that has not been admitted, to the jury.83  Thus, the jury will often be in the 
dark as to aspects of the basis for the expert opinion. 
 
 80.  United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 81.  FED. R. EVID. 104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court . . . .  In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges.”  The rule allows the court to consider information that is 
neither admitted nor admissible, and therefore is not disclosed to the jury. 
 82.  FED. R. EVID. 705 provides: “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires 
otherwise.  The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination.” 
 83.  Rule 703 was amended in 2000 to provide that “[f]acts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the 
court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”  FED. R. EVID. 703; see also Capra, The Daubert 
Puzzle, supra note 16, at 774–80 (discussing reasons for limiting disclosure of expert’s basis to jury). 
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Rule 701 does not specify whether the basis for a lay opinion must be 
disclosed to the jury.  However, logic dictates that the proponent must 
provide the jury with enough information to allow the jurors to evaluate the 
opinion and determine whether everyday reasoning supports the inferences 
drawn from the facts observed by the witness.  If the jury is not given 
sufficient information about the basis for the opinion, the opinion will not be 
helpful, since the jury’s only choice will be to take it or leave it.  Thus, the 
witness should present to the jury the information provided to the court in 
support of admitting the lay opinion.  The witness can give the jury an 
overview of her basis for the opinion or can cite specific facts that support 
the opinion.84  Correspondingly, if the witness relies on experience, she can 
explain that experience to the jury. 
D. Form of Testimony: The Hypothetical Question 
There may also be differences in the way in which expert and lay 
opinion are presented at trial.  Traditionally, expert witnesses often gave 
their opinion in response to hypothetical questions, a practice that is 
permitted under the Rules.85  The hypothetical question posits the key facts 
of the case to the witness as a hypothetical case and asks the witness to 
express an opinion based on those hypothetical facts.86  An attorney 
questioning a lay witness has less latitude to use a hypothetical. 
Some courts have asserted that only expert witnesses are permitted to 
answer hypothetical questions.87  In some cases, the personal knowledge 
requirement for lay opinion forecloses the use of hypothetical questions.  For 
example, in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, the 
plaintiff sued under an insurance policy covering his boat.88  At trial, the 
insurance company’s investigator was precluded from testifying as an expert 
due to the lack of pretrial notice.89  Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the 
 
 84.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 56 (suggesting that witness should provide as 
much concrete information as possible). 
 85.  See id. § 14, at 86–91 (discussing hypothetical questions as a vehicle for presenting expert 
opinion). 
 86.  See id. § 14, at 86–87; 31 AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 77, at 101–02 (2002). 
 87.  See United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
witness who was not testifying as an expert should not have been permitted to answer hypothetical 
question and emphasizing that the distinction between lay and expert witnesses lies in the ability to 
answer hypothetical questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 
1980) (stating “[t]he essential difference, however, is that a qualified expert may answer 
hypothetical questions” (citing the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 703)); see also 2 
WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 679, at 940 (stating that only skilled witnesses may respond to 
hypothetical questions); Fenner, supra note 29, at 977 (stating that lay witnesses are generally not 
allowed to respond to hypothetical questions). 
 88.  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 201 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 89.  Id. at 203. 
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investigator to respond to hypothetical questions concerning steps the 
plaintiff could have taken to mitigate the damage to the insured boat.90  The 
Fourth Circuit held that the testimony was improper coming from a lay 
witness.91  There were two problems: first, in answering the question the 
witness offered an opinion without personally observing the necessary facts, 
and, second, the questioning led the witness into areas where he would have 
needed expertise.92  The witness had not seen the accident and was not 
familiar with the area in which it occurred.93  As a result, the testimony went 
beyond that permitted under Rule 701.94 
However, a blanket assertion that lay witnesses cannot answer 
hypothetical questions is too sweeping to be accurate.  There are instances in 
which a hypothetical question can fairly be posed to a lay witness.  Suppose, 
for example, a witness testifies to the opinion that the deceased had the habit 
of stopping at a particular restaurant for breakfast on the way to work every 
weekday morning.95  The witness could then be asked, “If the deceased left 
for work at the usual time on August 2, 2009, what time would the deceased 
have arrived at the restaurant?”  The question is posed as a hypothetical, but 
calls for a conclusion within the witness’s competence and requires no 
expertise. 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 205–06. 
 92.  Id. at 204. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Cf. United States v. Wiseman, 339 F. App’x 196 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Wiseman, the trial court 
permitted an underwriting manager to respond to a series of hypothetical questions even though she 
had not been identified as an expert.  Id. at 198.  The court described the questioning as follows: 
The Government solicited Beck’s opinion concerning what she would have done if she 
had been presented with a loan application with similar representations of sale price and 
present value.  The Government asked: “Now, if you had all this information as indicated 
in this chart, that you had done if you were associated with both of these loans and had 
this information, what would you do with that loan?”  The Government later continued: 
“Now, let’s assume that as an underwriter or bank employee you have this information in 
front of you.  What, if anything, do you [do] with that loan file . . . ?”  And concerning 
the other property, the Government asked, “Now, I’ll ask you to assume for a moment 
that [the property] is in one of the most distressed areas . . . .  With that assumption in 
mind, what do you do with the . . . loan file?” 
Id.  The Third Circuit declined to address the propriety of the testimony and held that, if error, it was 
harmless.  Id. at 199. 
 95.  Federal Rule of Evidence 406 permits a witness to testify concerning habit.  See 
Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2293–94 (noting that before admitting evidence 
under Rule 406, the judge must assess whether the witness has observed enough instances of conduct 
to reach an opinion as to habit). 
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E. Pretrial Disclosure Requirements 
The rules of procedure in both civil and criminal cases mandate more 
extensive pretrial disclosure for expert witnesses than for other witnesses.  
The Rules require each party to designate its expert witnesses and provide 
pretrial reports describing their testimony.96  In contrast, lay opinion may be 
introduced with no advance notice.  An undesignated witness may therefore 
be limited to lay testimony.97 
The disclosure obligation has frequently been the focal point of disputes 
about the scope of the lay opinion rule.  Thus, a party that did not provide 
information about an opinion witness to the adverse party before trial may 
try to avoid exclusion of the evidence by arguing that the witness is a lay 
witness testifying to lay opinion.  Conversely, the opposing party will argue 
that the opinion is expert opinion and should therefore be excluded to 
sanction the failure to comply with the discovery rules.98 
The advance disclosure concerning expert witnesses protects the 
opposing party.99  Having received pretrial notice, the opposing party can 
prepare to respond to the expert testimony.  As a result, courts may be 
reluctant to treat opinion from an experienced witness as lay opinion because 
it allows the party to circumvent the pretrial disclosure requirement.  
However, the application of the rule of evidence should not be driven by 
procedural considerations. 
 
 96.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v. 
Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D. Me. 2006) (explaining the rationale for the disclosure 
requirement: “The Rule and the Scheduling Order are designed to place the opposing party on fair 
notice: once the expert’s qualifications and the bases for his opinion are disclosed, the opposing 
party possesses the necessary knowledge to consider the potential impact and to decide how to 
respond—to evaluate whether to engage in further discovery, such as a deposition, to investigate 
whether the technical and scientific basis for the proposed testimony is sound, and to determine 
whether to obtain a countervailing expert.”); see also Bigelow, supra note 3, at 8–10 (discussing the 
disclosure requirement); Gregory P. Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993 Disclosure 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97 (1996) (discussing issues raised 
by disclosure requirements). 
 97.  Downeast Ventures, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11. Professor Capra makes the point that “[t]he 
difference . . . boils down to disclosure obligations.”  Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, 
supra note 3, at 34. 
 98.  See, e.g., United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2006) (addressing 
defendant’s complaint that prosecution witness gave expert testimony without compliance with 
disclosure rule); United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2005); Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 
at 203–04 (witness restricted to lay testimony due to lack of pretrial notice); Downeast Ventures, 450 
F. Supp. 2d at 110–11 (noting that “prudent counsel will designate such a witness as an expert to 
avoid the accusation that he has proffered ‘an expert in lay witness clothing’”); see also Martinez & 
Arlyn-Pessin, supra note 3, at 28–29 (discussing the disclosure requirement). 
 99.  See United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Figueroa-
Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) (prosecution’s use of lay witness rules “subverts the 
requirements” of the pretrial discovery rule); Bamberger, supra note 5, at 871–77 (discussing 
importance of pretrial disclosure). 
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F.  Deference Accorded Expert Opinion 
A party may obtain the advantage of deference by designating a witness 
as an expert and presenting opinion as expert rather than lay opinion.  First, 
the judge may not subject the witness’s reasoning process to close 
consideration.100  Second, the witness’s opinion may gain enhanced 
credibility, giving the opinion testimony more weight in the jurors’ minds.101  
Finally, the party relying on the opinion may invoke the witness’s expert 
status in argument, inviting the jury to ascribe greater weight to the 
testimony because the witness is an expert.102 
IV. THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN ESTABLISHING  
THE BASIS FOR OPINION TESTIMONY 
The determination of whether an experience-based opinion is lay or 
expert has significant consequences, yet categorizing such opinions poses a 
particular challenge.  Before the 2000 amendments, the line between lay and 
expert opinion was less stark.  Once a court concluded that a witness, like 
Mona Lisa Vito of My Cousin Vinny, had unusual experience, the court 
could allow the witness to express an expert opinion drawing on that 
experience base without regard to whether the witness possessed a reliable 
methodology or applied anything other than ordinary reasoning skills to the 
 
 100.  See Moreno, supra note 5, at 5–7 (discussing inappropriate use of prosecution experts); Neil 
Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1177 
(2001) (summarizing studies and concluding that judges are not adept at evaluating expert 
testimony). 
 101.  See United States v. Webber, 259 F. App’x 796, 802 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the trial 
court instructed the jury that an agent had testified as an expert); United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 
893, 903 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting weight accorded expert testimony); United States v. Downing, 753 
F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that some expert testimony has an “aura of infallibility”); 
State v. Blackwell, 971 A.2d 296, 308 (Md. 2009) (noting “aura of certainty” that attached to 
officer’s testimony concerning horizontal gaze nystagmus test); Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 81 
(discussing weight accorded to expert testimony); Moreno, supra note 5, at 8.  If the court does not 
use the term “expert” to label the witness, the enhancement effect is likely to be contained.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (cautioning against instructing the jury that the witness is an 
“expert”); Charles Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word 
“Expert” Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in Criminal and Civil Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 
559 (1994).  But see Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 100, at 1177 (summarizing studies of juror 
comprehension and evaluation of expert testimony and concluding that jurors competently assess 
expert testimony). 
 102.  See, e.g., United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004).  In Grinage, the court 
noted: “[T]he Government in its rebuttal summation told the jury that ‘the agent has the background 
to make interpretations,’ suggesting either expertise, for which he had not been qualified, or 
investigative information not before the jury.”  Id. 
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knowledge base.103  The amendments hardened the line between the two 
types of opinion testimony, raising the question of when experience alone 
leads to the type of specialized knowledge that qualifies a witness as an 
expert and requiring a different approach to experience-based opinion 
testimony. 
The amendments to the Rules direct courts’ attention to the reasoning 
process employed by a witness in reaching an opinion.104  The Advisory 
Committee’s notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 701 state that “the 
distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony 
‘results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert 
testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only 
by specialists in the field.’”105  Thus, the distinction lies in whether the 
witness’s reasoning process entails a reliable methodology beyond everyday 
reasoning.106  A lay witness, however experienced, offers no methodology 
beyond ordinary reasoning.  An expert is equipped to draw more 
sophisticated, yet still reliable, inferences.107  The crux of expert testimony is 
that it presents inferences that are supported through the application of a 
reliable methodology.108  Thus, the witness who relies on experience to 
support an expert opinion cannot simply claim insights arrived at by 
applying everyday reasoning to that experience base, but must explain the 
methodology employed to reach that opinion.109  An experienced witness 
 
 103.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing former gang 
member to decode conversations for the jury); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (allowing former gang members to testify about the business of drug trafficking).  After 
Daubert was decided, but before Rule 702 was amended to require a demonstration of reliability for 
any expert testimony, courts debated whether experience-based expert testimony was subject to 
Daubert analysis at all.  See generally Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1246–48 
(M.D. La. 1996) (discussing debate and citing cases). 
 104.  United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005).  In Garcia, the court noted: 
In this case, the government made no attempt to demonstrate that Klemick’s challenged 
opinion was informed by reasoning processes familiar to the average person in everyday 
life rather than by scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. . . .  We hold that 
the foundation requirements of Rule 701 do not permit a law enforcement agent to testify 
to an opinion so based and formed if the agent’s reasoning process depended, in whole or 
in part, on his specialized training and experience. 
Id. at 216. 
 105.  FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 
(Tenn. 1992)). 
 106.  See United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that witnesses’ 
opinions were expert opinion because they rested on specialized reasoning process and not on 
everyday reasoning). 
 107.  McCormick explains: “The expert has something different to contribute.  This is the 
power—the knowledge or skill—to draw inferences from the facts which a jury could not draw at all 
or as reliably.”  1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 67. 
 108.  See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 113–22 (discussing the 
development and validation of new methodology); Laser, supra note 19, at 1418 (discussing 
meaning of methodology). 
 109.  The Advisory Committee commented: 
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who does not bring such methodology to bear should be subject to the 
restrictions of the lay opinion rule. 
The question for a court faced with an experience-based opinion is how 
the experience informs that opinion.  In considering that question and the 
implications for admitting experience-based opinion, a court should be 
guided by the rules governing the admissibility of similar evidence of 
experience. 
A. How Experience Informs Lay Opinion: Similar Happenings and Other 
Act Evidence 
All lay opinion testimony is based on experience.  The lay opinion 
witness brings life experience to bear on the observed facts and forms an 
opinion rationally based on those facts.110  The witness draws conclusions 
based on a background of experiencing similar happenings or events and 
 
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain 
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient 
basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.  The trial 
court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply “taking the expert’s word for it.” 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 
1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We’ve been presented with only the experts’ qualifications, their 
conclusions and their assurances of reliability.  Under Daubert, that’s not enough.”).  The Advisory 
Committee also noted: “The more subjective and controversial the expert’s inquiry, the more likely 
the testimony should be excluded as unreliable.”  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see 
O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) (expert testimony based on a 
completely subjective methodology held properly excluded); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999) (“[I]t will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose 
expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at 
a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.”).  
The Advisory Committee cited lower court decisions to support the assertion that experience alone 
may be sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.  However, those decisions suggest that expert 
testimony must be based on something more than simply experience.  For example, in United States 
v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1159–61 (6th Cir. 1997), discussing the admissibility of handwriting 
analysis, the court noted that the witness’s expertise was a product of knowledge, skill, education, 
and training, as well as experience, and commented further that the witness explained his procedure 
to the jury.  Similarly, in Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996), 
the expert witness brought far more than experience to his testimony: he had both undergraduate and 
master’s degrees in mechanical engineering; he had been employed for nine years by the Louisiana 
Productivity Center, working in areas that included product development, quality control, and 
manufacturing; he had an additional thirteen years of experience working at various companies in 
design engineering; he had served as a consultant in the design of various machines and structures.  
His proffered testimony concerning alternative designs was excluded because he had not applied his 
methodology to a reliable base of information.  Id. at 1250–52. 
 110.  Professor Imwinkelried asserts that “one of the most fundamental tests of the reliability of 
nonscientific opinion is whether it has any supporting experience, either personal or vicarious.”  
Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2291.  He goes on to cite Hume’s assertion that “the 
trustworthiness of an inference depends upon ‘a repetition of similar’ experiences.”  Id. 
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applies everyday reasoning informed by that experience to form the 
opinion.111  In order to determine that the opinion is rationally related to the 
witness’s knowledge, the court must make sure that the witness has the 
experience base, as well as the observed facts, to rationally derive the 
opinion.112 
The court should demand that the witness’s experience base include a 
sufficient sample of similar events, and that those past events support the 
witness’s inferences.  Applying these criteria, courts have admitted the 
opinions of unusually experienced lay witnesses, as well as the opinions of 
witnesses with a more ordinary experience base.113  But the test is always the 
 
 111.  See, e.g., Bank of China v. NBM LLC, 359 F.3d 171, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the witness who had acquired special knowledge when he conducted an investigation of the bank’s 
dealings with the defendant could give lay opinion based on that knowledge, and allowing the 
witness to testify concerning business community’s understanding, certain business concepts, and 
what constituted fraud in the transactions with which the witness was familiar); United States v. 
Jones, 24 F.3d 1177, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the defendant’s voice identification 
witness was not an expert because he could point to no reliable methodology supporting his 
testimony, but permitting him to testify to his lay opinion based on his aural comparison of the 
defendant’s voice with that on recordings introduced by the prosecution).  Jurors also bring 
experience to bear on the case.  See Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the role 
of experience in jurors’ assessments and holding that trial court committed error by instructing 
prospective jurors that they would have to set aside all their experiences to serve on the jury); 
Strong, supra note 47, at 353. 
 112.  See, e.g., Bank of China, 359 F.3d at 180–81 (holding that the trial court had improperly 
permitted the lay witness to testify to some opinions not clearly based on the witness’s perceptions); 
O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1106–07 (holding that the testimony of a physician claiming that he could 
recognize radiation-induced cataracts was properly excluded where the expert did not ground his 
opinion in the scientific literature and had only observed five cases of radiation induced cataracts). 
 113.  Courts have traditionally permitted property owners or those intimately involved with a 
business to provide lay opinion concerning the value of the property or workings of the business.  
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see, e.g., United States v. Wiseman, 339 F. App’x 196 
(3d Cir. 2009) (holding that witnesses experienced in real estate were properly permitted to testify as 
lay witnesses concerning loan process); LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928–
30 (10th Cir. 2004) (summarizing precedent and holding that company president could have testified 
to lost profits using ordinary techniques based on the company’s history, but could not testify to a 
model concerning moving averages, compounded growth rates, and S-curves, or other technical, 
specialized subjects in which he was not versed); Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar 
Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that company’s employees 
could properly testify as lay witnesses that company’s charges were reasonable); Asplundh Mfg. 
Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1198–99 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting examples); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. Wanzer, 897 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that bookkeeper should 
have been permitted to testify to lay opinion on the question of the profits from leases since she 
personally kept the relevant records); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 
1980) (holding that party’s accountant should have been permitted to provide lay opinion concerning 
party’s lost profits); Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006) 
(concluding that witness’s experience in engineering business qualified him to testify as a lay 
witness concerning engineering responsibilities); see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10, at 51 
(noting that a lay witness who was familiar with a business’s operation may be permitted to testify 
concerning the business’s profits).  But see Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207, 
215 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that lay witness lacked basis to express opinion concerning estimated 
lost earnings and pension benefits); JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 370 F.3d 519, 
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same: whether the witness has enough personal information drawn from 
experience and observation to reach the offered conclusion using everyday 
reasoning. 
Look for a moment at an example of routine lay opinion.  Testimony 
concerning the speed of a car is often cited as an example of unremarkable 
admissible lay opinion.114  Most adult lay witnesses have a sufficient 
experience base driving, riding in, and observing moving vehicles to be able 
to draw a rational inference concerning speed.  But consider a witness who 
has lived her entire life in central Manhattan, does not drive, and has never 
seen highway traffic.  As an adult, she ventures for the first time into the 
countryside and happens to witness a high-speed traffic accident.  Should 
she be permitted to testify that, in her opinion, the defendant’s car was 
moving sixty-five miles per hour?  She has no experience base that would 
assure the accuracy of her opinion.  While possessed of the necessary 
personal knowledge of the traffic accident, she does not have the 
accumulation of observed similar events necessary to legitimatize her 
opinion by assuring that it is rationally based on her knowledge.  Her 
opinion should be excluded.115  Lay opinion should not be admitted without 
the assurance that the witness has the requisite experience of observing 
sufficient similar events to draw accurate inferences. 
In some cases, the courts simply fail to apply Rule 701 with care.  For 
example, in United States v. Simas,116 the court held that agents had properly 
 
525–26 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that accountant-witness could not provide lay opinion on lost profits 
because he did not have personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s books). 
 114.  See Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2003) (listing speed of a vehicle as 
an example of the “limited” testimony permitted by Rule 701); Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1197 (citing 
speed of vehicle as quintessential lay opinion testimony); Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 
374 (Ky. 1999) (describing testimony about the speed of a moving vehicle as common lay opinion 
testimony); 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 26 (including the speed of a vehicle in list of 
common topics about which lay witnesses may testify); Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony, 
supra note 34, at 194 (listing the speed of a car as an example of admissible lay opinion testimony). 
 115.  See also 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 13 n.3 (discussing recluse who has no 
experience driving or riding in a car and concluding recluse would not be able to testify as to the 
observed speed of a car). 
 116.  937 F.2d 459, 464–65 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48, 
52–53 (1st Cir. 2004) (permitting officer to give lay opinion that gun possessed by defendant was 
manufactured outside Puerto Rico and therefore had traveled in interstate commerce).  In Colón, the 
witness’s lay opinion masked underlying evidence questions.  The court allowed the opinion because 
the officer had visited the factory in Massachusetts where the gun was manufactured.  Colón, 360 
F.3d at 53.  The information was “based on information gleaned from [the officer’s] personal 
experience . . . and was arrived at ‘from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life.’”  Id.  The 
officer did not see the gun manufactured, so he was necessarily relying on hearsay rather than his 
own knowledge.  It seems unlikely that a court would have permitted a non-law enforcement witness 
to testify that a particular item was manufactured in a particular location simply on the basis of 
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testified as lay witnesses concerning their understanding of certain 
ambiguous statements made by the defendant.  The court first noted that the 
agents had heard the actual statements, and concluded that the personal 
knowledge requirement of Rule 701 was therefore satisfied.117  The court 
further concluded that the helpfulness requirement was satisfied simply 
because the opinions would help the jury to make sense of the sometimes 
incomprehensible statements of the defendant.118  However, the court failed 
to implement the requirement that the opinion be rationally related to the 
facts observed by the witness.119  The court should have required the 
prosecution to demonstrate that, in addition to hearing the statements, the 
agents had a background that allowed them to interpret those statements, 
based on prior similar instances.  If that background was lacking, the 
opinions were not rationally derived and threatened to mislead the jury.  The 
court may have assumed that the agents based their interpretation on prior 
similar conversations with the defendant, but by failing to articulate that 
basis and the need for a rational connection between the opinion and the 
observed facts, the court stripped Rule 701 of its intended role.120 
The way in which experience informs lay opinion can be better 
understood by looking at other evidence that samples experience as a way of 
advancing fact-finding.  To understand how courts should approach 
experience-based testimony, one should consider how courts approach 
evidence of similar happenings and other acts.  These types of evidence 
require special scrutiny as a prerequisite to admissibility.  The same scrutiny 
should be applied to lay opinion, which purports to draw inferences from 
similar happenings or other acts. 
 
having visited the factory.  Courts have also allowed such testimony as expert testimony under Rule 
702, although it is not clear how the testimony satisfies the reliability requirements.  See United 
States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2006) (allowing agent to testify as expert regarding 
origin of weapon); United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2001) (ATF agent’s 
expert testimony regarding origin of weapon sufficient to establish interstate commerce element of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).  By treating the testimony as expert testimony, the courts allow the prosecution 
to employ a witness with no special methodology to rely on records and conversations to state an 
opinion, relieving the government of the obligation to obtain primary admissible evidence 
concerning a gun’s origin. 
 117.  Simas, 937 F.2d at 464. 
 118.  Id. at 465. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See also United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 903–05 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding agent’s 
testimony interpreting conversations largely admissible as lay opinion); United States v. De Peri, 
778 F.2d 963, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing witness to interpret conversations without 
considering basis for opinion).  In some cases, courts allow this testimony as expert testimony.  
Instead, it should be evaluated as lay testimony. 
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1.  Similar Happenings and Lay Opinion 
Events that are not part of the matter on which a trial focuses are not 
generally admissible.121  However, in some instances, such an event has 
particular probative value and is admitted as a similar happening.  The 
analysis of similar happenings evidence provides a model for evaluating lay 
opinion. 
Admissibility of similar happenings and other events is governed by 
Rules 402 and 403.122  Rule 402 provides that if evidence has probative 
value, it is admissible unless otherwise excluded.123  The probative value of 
other events generally turns on questions of similarity.124  Rule 403 permits 
the court to exclude evidence on grounds such as the risk of unfair prejudice, 
jury confusion, and waste of time.125  Similar happenings evidence often 
generates one or more of these problems and may be excluded as a result. 
While not generally admissible, similar happenings evidence may be 
admitted to establish the existence of a defect or dangerous condition or to 
prove notice of such a problem.126  For example, evidence of other auto 
accidents at a specific point on a highway may act as evidence that the 
stretch of road was defectively designed or constructed.  But the other 
accidents support that inference only if they happened under substantially 
similar conditions.  If the case on trial involves a fair weather accident and 
the other accidents occurred during inclement weather, then the other 
happenings have little probative value in the case on trial.  If the court 
admits evidence of the other accidents, the jury will apply everyday 
reasoning to determine the probative value, but may be confused or unfairly 
prejudiced because the other accidents are superficially similar, yet 
dissimilar in key respects.127  Thus, to determine the admissibility of the 
similar accidents, the trial court should scrutinize the offered evidence to 
determine whether the similarities permit the jury to draw the desired 
 
 121.  22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5170, at 111–12 (1978). 
 122.  Id. § 5170, at 116–18; see also Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982 (Me. 1980) 
(discussing use of other accidents to prove defect in sidewalk and applying Rule 402 and 403 to 
assess admissibility). 
 123.  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 124.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 196–200, at 788–808 (discussing criteria for admitting 
similar happenings and transactions). 
 125.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 126.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 200, at 802–04. 
 127.  22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 121, § 5170, at 114–16. 
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inference and whether the evidence will generate too great a risk of unfair 
prejudice or confusion.128 
The process of evaluating lay opinion should follow a parallel path.  The 
court should determine the basis for the opinion—both the perceived facts 
relevant to the case and the experience base of similar happenings that the 
witness can bring to bear on the issue.  The court should then ask whether 
everyday reasoning could support drawing the proffered opinion from that 
base of knowledge.  One possible basis for rejecting the opinion is a 
deficiency in the witness’s experience base.  If the witness has not observed 
enough similar happenings, the witness lacks the basis in personal 
experience to draw the opinion. 
Consider an example.  Suppose the defendant attempts to elicit the lay 
opinion that the plaintiff lost control of her car because it was snowing and 
she was driving too fast for the conditions.  If the witness had only observed 
driving in snowy conditions on two prior occasions, the witness would not 
have experienced enough similar situations to draw the desired conclusion 
about the plaintiff’s driving.  Like a jury confronted with improper similar 
happenings evidence, the witness may be led to the opinion by superficial 
similarity, confusion, or improper reasoning.  Even if the witness observed 
the entire accident, the witness should not be allowed to express that 
opinion. 
The lay testimony allowed in Soden v. Freightliner Corp.129 exemplifies 
lay testimony that has a proper experience base.  It illustrates the proper 
relationship between similar happenings evidence and lay opinion.  The 
plaintiffs in Soden, Soden’s widow and children, alleged that a design flaw 
in step brackets on the defendant’s truck had resulted in the death of Soden 
in a fire that erupted after the truck he was driving rolled over.130  The trial 
court permitted a witness with extensive experience servicing trucks to 
testify concerning the damage to the fuel tanks he observed on that particular 
truck involved in the accident, and also on two or three other trucks 
manufactured by the defendant that he had seen following other accidents.131  
The other accidents included one rollover and one or two jackknifes, and 
none involved a fire.132  However, in each of the accidents, the witness had 
observed puncture marks in the fuel tank near the location of the step 
 
 128.  Id. §§ 5213–14, at 258–73. 
 129.  714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 130.  Id. at 500. 
 131.  Id. at 510–11. 
 132.  Id.  The witness testified that on the other occasions, he had “seen puncture holes in the fuel 
tanks at the location of the step brackets” that were allegedly defective; that he had seen similar 
holes in the fuel tanks of the plaintiff’s truck; that the brackets caused the fire and that their design 
was dangerous; and that the plaintiff’s accident prompted him to modify the brackets by removing 
the pointed ends.  Id.  On appeal, the defendant challenged only the witness’s opinion testimony on 
cause and dangerousness.  Id. 
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brackets.133  The accidents were thus sufficiently similar on the issue of the 
brackets’ design and the punctures they caused in the accident.134  The 
differences in the way the accidents happened and the absence of fire did not 
affect the witness’s ability to infer that the brackets tended to puncture the 
fuel tank and were therefore dangerously designed.135  The evidence of the 
similar events could have been admitted, and the lay opinion based on those 
events was properly allowed.136 
When a party offers lay opinion, the court should ask whether the other 
events on which the witness bases her reasoning satisfy the criteria applied 
to similar happenings.  The trial court should assess the points of similarity 
and difference to determine whether the events in the witness’s prior 
experience have sufficient probative value, and determine whether the 
differences undermine the probative value or inject confusion.  When the 
witness’s experience includes enough similar instances to support the 
offered opinion, the witness should describe to the jury, at least in summary, 
the similar happenings that form the experience base so the jury can then 
determine the appropriate weight to accord the opinion.  Unfortunately, 
courts do not always include this step in their evaluation of lay opinion.137 
2. Other Act Evidence and Lay Opinion 
Lay opinion sometimes purports to draw conclusions about an actor’s 
behavior based on that actor’s prior conduct.  The witness takes what she 
knows about the actor and uses that as a basis for interpreting the actor’s 
behavior in the context of the case on trial.  The courts should approach such 
lay opinion cautiously.  The law carefully circumscribes the use of character 
and other act evidence.138  Lay opinion based on such evidence should be 
subject to the same limitations. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence strictly limit the use of a person’s 
character or acts at other times as a basis for inferring action at the time in 
question.139  The law generally prohibits proof of character—the type of 
person someone is—as a basis for concluding how the person acted at the 
 
 133.  Id. at 510. 
 134.  Id. at 511–12. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 512. 
 137.  See infra Section VI.C. 
 138.  See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 139.  See id. 
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time in question.140  Other act evidence141 is restricted because of the risk 
that the jury will use this evidence to draw inferences about the character or 
conduct of the actor.  The chain of inference, either from character to action 
in conformity or from other acts to character to action in conformity, is 
specifically prohibited by the Federal Rules of Evidence in most instances.142  
Lay opinion regarding an actor based on the actor’s past conduct should be 
held to corresponding limitations. 
There are two ways an actor’s prior conduct may become admissible at 
trial as evidence of the actor’s behavior—as evidence of habit or as the basis 
for judging an actor’s character in the limited circumstances in which 
character evidence is admissible.143  The rules governing habit evidence 
 
 140.  See id. 
 141.  Other act evidence refers to proof of the person’s conduct at some time other than events 
that are the subject of the trial. 
 142.  FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  But see FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(3), 413–15. 
 143.  Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides that evidence of a person’s character or a trait of 
character is admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion in the following limited situations: 
(1) Character of Accused.  In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under 
Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution; (2) Character of Alleged Victim.  In a criminal case, and subject to the 
limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; (3) Character of Witness.  Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(3).  In those instances, the party may establish character by calling an 
opinion witness.  See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 341–51 (describing use of 
opinion evidence to establish a defendant’s character).  The party may also prove character with 
evidence of reputation.  FED. R. EVID. 405.  See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 
342–45 (listing and describing the use of reputation evidence in establishing character of defendant).  
Reputation represents a more filtered assessment of conduct over time.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra 
note 3, § 187, at 746 (describing reputation evidence as the “preferred mode of proof of character”); 
1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 344 (noting that all courts permit the use of 
reputation testimony, and describing such testimony as “likely to be fairly trustworthy”).  Also, if 
character is an element of a claim or defense, the party can introduce specific instances of conduct to 
allow the jury to infer character from past conduct.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 187, at 
744–47 (noting that, when character is a material fact in a case, courts typically permit evidence of 
specific acts); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 405:2, at 919–20 (noting that specific instances of conduct 
may be introduced into evidence whenever character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or 
defense); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 344 (stating that evidence of specific acts 
are permissible when a defendant’s character is “an ultimate, material fact in the case”).  The opinion 
regarding the person’s character is based on the witness’s assessment of the person’s past behavior 
in light of the witness’s experience of people in general.  The character witness must have both a 
sufficient sampling of the person’s conduct and sufficient relevant life experience to rationally 
support the opinion.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30 (stating that “a foundation 
must be laid as to the witness’s personal knowledge of facts to which the observed facts are being 
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relate closely to lay opinion.  Proof of habit may be admitted to prove 
behavior consistent with the actor’s habitual behavior only if evidence of the 
actor’s past conduct establishes a pattern so regular and consistent that it 
supports an inference about the actor’s behavior at the time in question.144  
Habit may be established one of two ways.  The party may prove enough 
specific instances of conduct that the jury can fairly infer the behavior was 
habitual.  Alternatively, the party may present a witness who can testify to 
the habit.145  The witness’s testimony takes the form of lay opinion and 
should be assessed accordingly.146  To arrive at the opinion, the witness 
applies ordinary reasoning and knowledge gleaned from experience with 
other people to the witness’s observation of the actor.  The witness must 
have a large enough sampling of the behavior in question to rationally 
conclude it is habitual.147  Thus, when determining whether habit evidence is 
admissible, the court must ensure that the instances of similar behavior 
presented to the jury or known to the opinion witness support the conclusion 
about habit as an indicator of likely conduct at the time in question. 
 
compared”); see also United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  In 
Williams, the D.C. Circuit noted: 
The Office of Legal Education of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys 
provides guidelines to establish a proper foundation for the opinion testimony of a skilled 
lay observer: 1. That the witness has, on prior occasions sufficient in number to support a 
reasonable inference of knowledge of or familiarity with a subject, observed particular 
events, conditions, or other matters. 
Williams, 212 F.3d at 1309–10 n.6. 
 144.  FED. R. EVID. 406 provides: 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether 
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove 
that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with the habit or routine practice. 
 145.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 195, at 786 (listing witness testimony and specific 
instances as methods of proving habit, and noting that witness testimony is the most common 
method of proof); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:4, at 949 (noting that, while Rule 406 is silent on 
the method of proof, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Proposed Rule 406(b) listed opinion 
testimony and proof of “specific instances [of conduct] sufficient in number to warrant a finding [of] 
habit” as methods of proof); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 809, at 363 (listing specific 
instances and opinion evidence as “recognized methods” of proving existence of habit). 
 146.  See 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:4, at 951 (noting that a lay witness may provide 
testimony regarding habit, and that such testimony must comply with the provisions of Rule 701); 1 
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 809, at 364 (stating that judges should determine the 
admissibility of lay opinion using Rule 701 criteria). 
 147.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 195, at 786 (noting that there must be enough instances 
to establish habit); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:2, at 940 (stating that habit testimony is 
admissible “only if a sufficient pattern of repeated responses is established”). 
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Other act evidence may also be admitted if it is relevant for a non-
character, non-conduct purpose.148  To admit other act evidence on this 
basis, the trial court must determine that the evidence plays a non-character 
role and will not simply be used as character evidence.  Thus, the court has 
to assess the connection between the other act evidence and the permissible 
inference for which it is offered.  Moreover, even if the evidence has 
probative value for a non-character purpose, the court has discretion to 
exclude the evidence if it is substantially more likely that the jury would use 
it as evidence of character and action in conformity than for the permitted 
purpose.149 
Thus, other act evidence is subject to strict rules.  In the situations in 
which such evidence is admissible, the trial court is required to carefully 
assess the basis for offering the evidence and its probative value for the 
permitted purpose.  Opinion testimony based on observation of past conduct 
should be similarly scrutinized and restricted.150 
3.  Evidence of Third Party Conduct and Lay Opinion 
Lay opinion is sometimes derived from assessments based on third party 
conduct.  The witness takes what she knows about the behavior of others and 
uses that as a basis for interpreting or predicting the behavior of the actor in 
question.  The courts should approach lay opinion that rests on third party 
conduct with particular caution.  Evidence of third party conduct is rarely 
admissible, and lay opinion based on such evidence should likewise be 
restricted. 
Evidence of a third party’s conduct provides little probative insight into 
how someone else acted.  Such use of third party conduct raises the concerns 
underlying both evidence of similar happenings and evidence of the prior 
conduct of the actor.  Superficial similarity may draw the witness and the 
jury to unfounded inferences.  A witness using third party behavior to form 
an opinion may over-generalize, reaching unsupported conclusions. 
Take a simple example.  Suppose the defendant crashes her car into a 
tree, injuring a passenger in the car.  Suppose also that two other drivers in 
the previous six months crashed into the same tree and were shown to have 
been negligent.  Can the passenger-plaintiff introduce evidence of those 
 
 148.  Other act evidence may also be admissible when it proves something other than character 
and conduct in conformity, such as identity, motive, or knowledge.  FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 149.  FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  See also 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 404:5, at 607 (discussing Rule 403). 
 150.  Cf. Moreno, supra note 5, at 43–44 (suggesting that drug jargon testimony acts 
impermissibly as evidence of bad character by suggesting to the jury that the defendant learned the 
jargon while engaged in prior drug dealing). 
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crashes and ask the jury to infer that, because those two drivers were 
negligent, the defendant was also negligent?  The answer is clearly no.  If all 
three drivers were driving rental cars, could the plaintiff introduce that 
evidence and ask the jury to conclude that the plaintiff, having the use of the 
rental car in common with the third parties, was therefore negligent?  Again, 
the answer is a clear no.  While evidence of similar accidents may be used to 
establish a static condition, such as defect in the design or maintenance of 
the road,151 it cannot be used to prove the behavior of the plaintiff.  
Correspondingly, a witness should not be allowed to base a lay opinion that 
the defendant was negligent on the conduct or characteristics of the other 
two drivers. 
That is not to say that third party conduct is never relevant or that a lay 
opinion based on third party conduct is never admissible.152  In some 
situations, experience with the behavior of others can appropriately inform a 
witness’s lay assessment.  For example, the lay opinion that a person acted 
intoxicated may be based entirely on the comparison of the person’s conduct 
with that of intoxicated third parties observed by the witness at other 
times.153  If the person in question exhibits similar behavior, the witness can 
fairly opine that the person was intoxicated.154 
When lay opinion rests in part on third party conduct, the court should 
challenge and scrutinize the underlying chain of inferences.  The court 
should demand a very high level of similarity between the third party 
conduct and that of the person in question.  The court should also make sure 
 
 151.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 324.3, at 418 (discussing the admissibility of evidence 
of similar accidents and injuries and the role the evidence may play). 
 152.  In some cases, courts exclude testimony based on a third party that is relevant and would be 
helpful to the jury.  In Trevino v. City of Rock Island Police Department, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206–
08 (C.D. Ill. 2000), the court rejected the testimony of a monocular police officer on a range of 
issues relating to whether a monocular officer could appropriately perform the job of a police officer.  
The court held that the witness did not qualify as an expert.  Id. at 1208.  Instead, the court should 
have recognized the witness as an experienced lay witness and permitted him to testify concerning 
his ability to execute specific tasks.  The witness’s conduct could help the jury understand the extent 
to which monocularism does or does not impede the ability to function as an officer. 
 153.  See, e.g., United States v. Denny, 48 F. App’x 732, 737–38 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
admissibility of a witness’s statement that defendant was “extremely intoxicated” as appropriate lay 
witness testimony); Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(listing lay witness opinion that an individual appeared drunk as exemplary of Rule 701 testimony); 
State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37, 43 (S.D. 1984) (upholding lay testimony of police officers that 
defendant was intoxicated based on the officers’ previous interactions with intoxicated individuals). 
 154.  Of course, even in these situations, an opinion based solely on comparison with third parties 
who exhibited similar behavior by definition does not take into account the personal situation of the 
actor and will be wrong if the symptoms are caused by insulin imbalance or some other condition 
that manifests itself in similar symptoms.  The use of reliable methodology, such as a blood test or a 
breathalyzer test, will avoid this problem. 
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that the inferences drawn from the third party conduct are fair in the context 
of the particular case.  In addition, the court should guard against the 
possibility that the opinion invites the jury to view the person in question as 
sharing character traits with the third parties and acting in conformity with 
that character. 
Unfortunately, courts sometimes admit opinion based on third party 
conduct without adequate scrutiny.155  For example, courts routinely admit 
law enforcement testimony concerning drug jargon, opining that the 
defendant’s words were actually code or jargon for drug-related terms.  The 
opinion concerning the meaning of terms is based on having heard third 
parties use them in a context that revealed their meaning to the witness, and 
inferring therefore that the defendant is using the terms in the same way.156  
This jargon testimony is merely lay opinion based on the conduct of third 
parties.  While the testimony may sometimes be admissible, the court should 
ensure that the opinion witness has heard the exact jargon used in 
sufficiently similar circumstances an adequate number of times to 
reasonably infer that the defendant’s meaning is the same as that of the third 
parties’ meaning. 
B. How Experience Informs Expert Opinion 
Most expert opinion also rests to some degree on the experience of the 
witness.157  However, regardless of the extent to which an expert relies on 
experience, the expert must demonstrate a reliable methodology.158 
If the witness offers expert opinion, employing a specialized 
methodology to develop inferences based in part on a rich experience base, 
the court must inform itself about the methodology, assuring itself that the 
methodology is reliable and was reliably applied to an adequate basis of 
 
 155.  See infra Section VI.D. 
 156.  United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2006 WL 2699042, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
19, 2006) (describing manner in which law enforcement officer arrived at understanding of jargon).  
In Diaz, although it treated the witness as an expert, the court recognized that jargon testimony rests 
on “repetition and context” and properly held that the officer should not have been permitted to 
testify to the meaning of a phrase he had never heard used before.  Id. at *3–4. 
 157.  See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without 
Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 255, 259–60 (2003) (discussing basis for expert 
testimony and noting that the “essence of the expert’s testimony is that this case is like other 
similarly situated cases in the world”); Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony, supra note 34, at 204 
(arguing that experts necessarily rely on “accumulated, vicarious experience” and not solely on 
personal experience).  But see David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the 
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003) (complaining that expertise 
based on experience does not fit into the analytical framework of Daubert or amended Rule 702). 
 158.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (emphasizing reliability requirement). 
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information relevant to the case.159  The court should ask what the witness 
has done with the experience. 
The line dividing expert opinion and lay opinion from a witness with 
unusual experience is sometimes very fine.160  In United States v. Kayne, for 
example, the jury needed help determining the value of the rare coins the 
defendants had allegedly sold for inflated prices.161  The prosecution called 
eight coin dealers to testify concerning the value of the coins, and the First 
Circuit saw no error, noting that “[o]pinions of value are a traditional subject 
of expert testimony.”162  The witnesses were experienced and explained their 
methods of assessing value.163  The court did not elaborate on the witnesses’ 
methodology, but consider the possibilities: If a coin dealer merely assessed 
value based on personal experience buying and selling similar coins, the 
witness’s opinion should be treated as lay opinion.  If the witness’s opinion 
reflected the use of more far-reaching research and application of method,164 
the witness should be evaluated as an expert. 
V. THE RISK OF ADMITTING OPINION BASED ON EXPERIENCE ALONE 
Whether or not a witness is an expert, a party may seek to gain an 
advantage by pushing the limits of permitted opinion testimony.  The risk 
with all experience-based opinion is that the jury will defer to the witness’s 
 
 159.  If the expert cannot demonstrate a reliable connection between the facts and the opinion, the 
opinion should be excluded.  See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 277–79 (5th Cir. 
1998) (concluding that trial court properly excluded aspects of opinion that were not shown to be 
reliably grounded in science); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert 
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 48–
60 (2003) (discussing evaluation of witness whose expertise is based in part on experience). 
 160.  See, e.g., Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 591 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
witness whose professional experience included responsibility for safety of power facilities from 
lightning was qualified to give expert testimony concerning the safety of the tower in which plaintiff 
claimed to have been struck by lightning).  The court did not elaborate on the witness’s experience.  
Whether he was fairly treated as an expert would depend on whether he analyzed the tower’s safety 
with the help of some reliable methodology acquired through his experience or whether he simply 
used everyday reasoning and analogized from events in his experience. 
 161.  United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 162.  Id. at 11–12. 
 163.  Id. at 12. 
 164.  The witness could research the provenance of the coins and the price the coins would bring 
in different geographic markets and at different times.  See United States v. Numisgroup Int’l Corp., 
170 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the use of an expert witness with a history 
of leadership and success in the numinstatic community to testify as to the grade and appraisal value 
of fraudulent coins); see also 95 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 38–41, 44–57, at 271–80, 285–337 
(2009) (providing history of coin appraisal and grading, including how a witness may be considered 
an expert in the field, and the role of opinion testimony as to coin value). 
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inferential process simply because the witness has superior information.165  
A witness with a long history of observing a particular type of behavior may 
draw conclusions based on those observations.  However, experience alone 
does not assure reliability.166  A rich experience base does not necessarily 
sharpen the witness’s reasoning process, and may deepen the witness’s 
bias.167 
In addition, the admission of experience-based opinion creates the 
opportunity for overreaching when courts fail to subject the opinion to 
appropriate scrutiny.  If the court fails to determine that the witness’s 
experience base fits the issue and that the witness’s reasoning from 
experience is reliable, a party may exploit the opportunity, pushing beyond 
the fair use of the opinion witness.  The party may use the opinion witness to 
vouch for inferences only loosely supported by the evidence or add the 
expert’s imprimatur to inferences more properly left for counsel’s 
argument.168  The party may elicit testimony that goes beyond what can be 
rationally inferred from the witness’s particular combination of experience 
 
 165.  While recognizing that expert opinion may be based on experience alone, the Advisory 
Committee cautions courts to approach such testimony with care.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory 
committee’s note; see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 482–83 (discussing 
experience-based expertise under Rule 702). 
 166.  See Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 486 (recognizing that “connoisseur” 
testimony may not be admissible under Rule 702 because its reliability cannot be shown); D. 
Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: 
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002) (considering ways in 
which inaccuracy affects forensic sciences). 
 167.  See Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989).  In Donlin, the Third Circuit stated: “When a lay 
witness has particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may testify—even if the 
subject matter is specialized or technical—because the testimony is based upon the layperson’s 
personal knowledge rather than on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”  Donlin, 
564 F.3d at 215.  In Paiva, the First Circuit held that a drug user who had tasted and observed the 
appearance of the questioned substance could properly testify to a lay opinion that it was cocaine.  
Paiva, 892 F.2d at 157.  The court stated: 
Although a drug user may not qualify as an expert, he or she may still be competent, 
based on past experience and personal knowledge and observation, to express an opinion 
as a lay witness that a particular substance perceived was cocaine or some other drug. 
. . . The liberalization of Rule 701 has blurred any rigid distinctions that may have existed 
between lay witnesses and expert witnesses. . . .  No longer is lay opinion testimony 
limited to areas within the common knowledge of ordinary persons.  Rather, the 
individual experience and knowledge of a lay witness may establish his or her 
competence, without qualification as an expert, to express an opinion on a particular 
subject outside the realm of common knowledge. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gross & Mnookin, supra note 67, at 156–58 (discussing the risk of 
bias in law enforcement testimony based on experience); Moreno, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing the 
hazards of reasoning from experience, which include the risk that the witness will rely on intuition or 
will reach conclusions that are “personal, idiosyncratic, and subjective”). 
 168.  See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2005) (condemning the use of 
introductory overview by opinion witness and remarking that “[t]he law already provides an 
adequate vehicle for the government to ‘help’ the jury gain an overview of anticipated evidence as 
well as a preview of its theory of each defendant’s culpability: the opening statement”). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:30 PM 
[Vol. 39: 551, 2012] Experience-Based Opinion Testimony 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
593 
and observation, introducing opinion testimony that should not properly be 
admitted.169 
Courts should distinguish between applying ordinary reasoning to a 
broad experience base and applying some reliable methodology informed by 
a broad experience base.170  If the witness brings no reliable methodology 
beyond everyday reasoning from observed similar situations to the proffered 
opinion, the witness should be evaluated as a lay witness, subject to the 
corresponding limitations.  The court should question whether the opinion is 
rationally based on the witness’s perception—whether it rests on inferences 
fairly drawn from the witness’s experience—and the jury should be invited 
to scrutinize the opinion in the same way. 
In some cases, courts defer too readily to claims that a witness can draw 
certain inferences based on experience.  The courts should recognize that 
mere experience, uninformed by methodological analysis, can lead to false 
inferences.171  The very experience base that qualifies the witness may bias 
the witness to view new situations through a distorted lens—swayed by an 
anecdotal sense of what inferences can be drawn, but not by any reliable 
method of approach.172 
 
 169.  See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 188–91 (2d Cir. 2008) (correcting trial 
court’s erroneous admission of “expert” testimony that drew together hearsay from unspecified 
sources to summarize the activity of the gang whose members were on trial, and noting “it is a little 
too convenient that the Government has found an individual who is expert on precisely those facts 
that the Government must prove to secure a guilty verdict—even more so when that expert happens 
to be one of the Government’s own investigators”); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 
744–45 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the prosecution’s expert witness’s testimony “essentially 
amounted to an expert opinion that the items he himself had found in [the defendant’s] home 
demonstrated a conspiracy to distribute cocaine”); see also United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 
1264–65 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that trial court properly excluded witness’s testimony concerning 
physical evidence that would be “expected” in case of rape). 
 170.  Courts have recognized, for example, that witnesses with medical training and expertise 
should not be permitted to present an opinion based on their anecdotal observations in their medical 
practice.  See David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2147–60 (1994) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence] (discussing cases); see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra 
note 16, at 476–77 (giving examples of scientific opinions based on “educated guesses” rather than 
reliable methodology and proven to be wrong). 
 171.  See Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 720–23 (discussing the problems of 
anecdotal information as a basis for reliable opinion).  Professor Capra points out two problems with 
anecdotal information: it may be too limited a sample to support the conclusion and it may be too 
dissimilar to support the conclusion.  But see Crump, supra note 157, at 26 (assuming that Freud’s 
dream theories should be admissible and referring to the exclusion of fingerprint ID as 
“nonsensical”).  Professor Crump seems reluctant to entertain challenges to accepted “science” even 
though it is not shown to rest on reliable foundation. 
 172.  See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
government expert on drug jargon “appears at times to have interpreted cryptic language as referring 
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Experience-based opinion may be skewed by perception bias—the 
tendency to ascribe greater significance to observed facts than is 
warranted.173  A witness who identifies with a particular point of view will 
view the data through that prism, skewing the inferences drawn.174  As a 
result, an untrained witness who has observed certain patterns may 
overgeneralize, drawing bad conclusions.  The witness may leap to 
unwarranted inferences, ascribing more significance to the knowledge base 
than it supports.175  Reasoning solely from experience, the witness may be 
prone to biased conclusions.  One role of reliable methodology is to 
minimize the impact of bias.176 
Another source of unreliability when a witness reasons from experience 
to opinion without the benefit of reliable methodology has been referred to 
as “post hoc reasoning.”177  Post hoc reasoning imputes significance to 
 
to cocaine simply because he believed appellants to be cocaine traffickers” and condemning “[s]uch 
circular, subjective reasoning”); see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 453–55 
(arguing that modern rules for expert testimony are necessary due to adversarial bias on the part of 
expert witnesses); Risinger et al., supra note 166, at 19–26 (discussing how bias impacts observation 
and conclusions). 
 173.  See KEITH A. FINDLEY, CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH (B. Cutler ed., 2010) (discussing the problem of “tunnel-vision,” which leads law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors to focus on information that supports their conclusion of a 
defendant’s guilt while ignoring information that goes against the established conclusion); 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing the “willingness to ignore 
base rate information in assessing the probative value of information” and  noting, for example, that 
the significance of finding carpet fibers that match those in the suspect’s home depends on the base 
rate—the rate at which those fibers are found in other homes); Moreno, supra note 5, at 39 
(addressing the threat of prejudice posed by a law enforcement officer who offers expert testimony 
based solely on subjective on-the-job experiences); see also United States v. Murphy, 457 F. Supp. 
2d 1228, 1231 (D. Kan. 2006) (acknowledging that a witness’s bias may cause the court to enforce 
requirements for expert testimony more strictly). 
 174.  The committee that undertook a study of forensic sciences for the Academies of Science saw 
bias as a sufficiently large problem and they recommended research on “human observer bias and 
sources of human error in forensic examinations.”  STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 
6, at 24, 122–24 (discussing the role of bias and recommending a study of the issue and steps to 
reduce the impact of bias); see also Angela Fagerlin et al., Reducing the Influence of Anecdotal 
Reasoning on People’s Health Care Decisions: Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Statistics?, 25 MED. 
DECISION MAKING 398, 398–99 (2005) (explaining the tendency of anecdotal information to 
influence medical decisions); Emily L.B. Lykins et al., Beliefs About Cancer Causation and 
Prevention as a Function of Personal and Family History of Cancer: A National, Population-Based 
Study, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 967, 972 (2008) (explaining how beliefs concerning cancer are 
influenced by personal and family history of cancer).  One may also hypothesize that experts will 
intentionally manipulate the evidence if courts do not adequately check for reliability.  See Laser, 
supra note 19, at 1409. 
 175.  Bias may lead one to become anchored to an early conclusion or to “see patterns that do not 
actually exist.”  STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 123–24. 
 176.  Id. at 122 (discussing bias). 
 177.  See Bernstein, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, supra note 170, at 2147–49 (discussing 
post hoc reasoning). 
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observed events that is not statistically warranted.178  Only the application of 
reliable assessment can assure the court that the opinion witness is not 
engaging in such faulty reasoning.  Consider again the example of a law 
enforcement witness who testifies that the defendant’s use of a rental car 
indicates that defendant is an experienced narcotics trafficker.179  The 
agent’s opinion ascribes criminal significance to facially neutral conduct.  
The agent did not bring any special methodology to the opinion interpreting 
the defendant’s conduct; the agent brings only experience—repeated 
observations of similar conduct—and pooled information gathered from 
other law enforcement agents.  Both the agent and the sources of the pooled 
information are biased sources.  The result may be a biased and unwarranted 
opinion.  Before allowing the opinion, the court should analyze it closely. 
The testimony of this law enforcement witness should not be viewed as 
expert opinion.180  No methodology plays a role in arriving at the conclusion 
that use of a rental car suggests an experienced drug dealer.  In addition to 
the witness’s own observations of this and of prior drug transactions, the 
witness may have obtained information from other agents either anecdotally 
or through some sort of training classes.  In effect, these amount to a single 
argument: that the witness is an expert by virtue of access to the law 
enforcement community’s pooled information.  But the collective 
information is derived from pooling experience-based knowledge and 
beliefs, without subjecting the information and conclusions to testing under 
the lens of some reliable methodology.  The reasoning underlying the expert 
opinion, while collective, is familiar lay reasoning applied by a group that is 
biased by its focus on investigation of narcotics trafficking: “We have seen 
this happen often enough that we think it is significant in this particular 
way.”  The court should not allow that conclusion to be presented to the jury 
without scrutinizing its foundation and justification.  Before allowing this as 
 
 178.  See id. (discussing illustration of a physician who observes a small sample of children who 
develop a brain tumor after receiving measles vaccine and infers a causal relationship).  Professor 
Bernstein criticizes the courts for accepting such reasoning too readily, noting that family physicians 
often gave such testimony.  Id. at 2145. 
 179.  United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Capra, 
Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 3, 34 (discussing Figueroa-Lopez).  In 
Figueroa-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the prosecution’s argument that the opinion was 
admissible as lay opinion, but held that the opinion would be admissible only if the witness was 
qualified as an expert.  Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1247. 
 180.  See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that to arrive at the 
conclusion that only guilty people are present at a drug deal, the law enforcement expert “assumes 
that everyone present is culpable and uses that assumption as the ‘proof’ of culpability,” and 
condemning the reasoning as unreliable). 
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expert opinion, the court must demand that some reliable methodology be 
employed to counteract the effect of inferences drawn by biased observers. 
The agent’s opinion should be evaluated as lay opinion.  The court 
should gather enough information about the agent’s experience base to 
assess the relationship between the information known to the agent and the 
proffered opinion, asking if the agent’s conclusion is rationally related to the 
facts perceived.  The court cannot properly evaluate the opinion without 
information about the frequency of drug deals not involving rented cars, the 
frequency and characteristics of drug deals involving rental cars, and the 
frequency of use of rental cars for other purposes in the relevant community.  
The court can assure that the witness’s opinion is fairly grounded in 
observed facts and not skewed by the witness’s bias only if it is fully 
informed on the underlying basis. 
VI. SCRUTINIZING EXPERIENCE-BASED OPINION:  
APPLYING RULE 701 WITH BITE 
Courts often fail to subject experience-based opinion to proper scrutiny 
under either the standards for lay opinion or those for expert opinion.  At 
times, courts accept too readily claims that a witness’s unspecified 
experience base supports the inferences expressed in a lay opinion.  At other 
times, courts inappropriately accept claims that a witness has developed 
relevant expertise from experience alone.  In both situations, juries are 
permitted to hear unsupported opinion testimony that should be deemed 
inadmissible. 
The following subsections detail five steps the courts should take to 
control the use of experience-based opinion testimony.  These steps should 
be added to the comments to Rule 701 to provide stronger protection from 
unfounded and unreliable opinion testimony.  First, instead of treating 
witnesses as experts by virtue of their experience and training, the court 
should evaluate them as experienced lay witnesses.  Second, the court should 
not take at face value claims of expertise based on training or shared 
experience; such claims may reflect nothing more than a set of unreliable 
beliefs shared by a particular group.  Third, the court should scrutinize 
opinions informed by the witness’s experience, asking if the witness’s 
experience base includes enough similar observations to support the 
witness’s opinion.  Fourth, the court should limit the extent to which a 
witness can base an opinion on the conduct of unrelated third parties.  
Finally, the court should check the inferences drawn from experience and 
prohibit over-claiming, preventing the witness from drawing broad, 
inadequately supported opinions. 
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A. Evaluate Experience-Based Opinion as Lay Opinion 
The lay opinion rule provides the preferred framework for analyzing 
experience-based opinion because every lay opinion represents the 
application of ordinary reasoning to the witness’s cumulated experience to 
inform personal observation.181  Accordingly, the courts should scrutinize 
these opinions to ensure that they are rationally derived from the witness’s 
experience base using everyday reasoning.  Thus, the opinions of the 
witnesses described in the hypothetical cases at the beginning of this 
Article—Mona Lisa Vito, the law enforcement witness with experience in 
drug cases, and the witness whose opinion rests on experience with 
motorcycles—should be evaluated as lay opinion.  Only when the witness 
brings a reliable methodology to bear on the experience should the witness’s 
testimony be evaluated under the rules governing expert testimony.  
Specifically, the rules governing lay opinion should constrain opinion 
testimony from witnesses who base their opinions on a deep experience 
base, but no reliable methodology, by ensuring that the opinion is rationally 
related to the witness’s knowledge and experience. 
In some cases, courts erroneously admit opinion evidence that should be 
excluded because it fails to satisfy the requirements for either lay or expert 
opinion.182  In Satcher v. Honda Motor Co.,183 for example, the plaintiff 
 
 181.  This will allow the proponent to present the opinion testimony without complying with the 
pretrial disclosure rules applicable to expert testimony.  See discussion of pretrial disclosure rules 
supra Section III.C.2.  The opposing party’s protection will lie in the trial court’s careful assessment 
of the opinions offered and the court’s discretion to permit the opposing party additional time to 
prepare cross-examination or obtain a responsive witness. 
 182.  See, e.g., Betterbox Commc’ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2002).  In 
Betterbox, a trademark infringement case tried before the amendments to Rule 702 went into effect, 
the Third Circuit affirmed the admission of expert testimony based on experience, but acknowledged 
that there was no showing of reliable methodology.  Id. at 328–29.  While an expert could apply 
reliable methodology to determine the likelihood of confusion, these experts did not, so their 
testimony should not have been admitted as expert testimony.  Id. at 329–30.  Nor was it clear that 
their testimony satisfied the requirements for lay opinion.  Id. 
  The testimony of forensic experts also poses problems that should be addressed by more 
exacting application of the rules governing lay and expert opinion.  See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 127–82 (challenging the reliability of a number of forensic sciences); 
Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 74 n.126 (demonstrating the lack of reliability of bite-mark 
evidence that is routinely admitted); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 459–61 (forensic 
testimony); Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert Evidence as 
Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 819–22 (2007). 
  Arson testimony illustrates the way in which courts have accepted claims of experience-
based expertise and admitted unfounded expert opinion where evaluation of the experience as a basis 
for lay opinion should have prompted the courts to exclude the evidence.  See STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173 (discussing the unreliability of arson expertise); David 
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claimed that the motorcycle he had been riding at the time of his injury was 
not crashworthy, alleging that it should have had crash bars.  At trial, the 
efficacy of using crash bars was disputed.184  To support his claim, the 
plaintiff called a former police officer as an expert to give his opinion that 
the crash bars used on police motorcycles were “effective in reducing 
injuries.”185  The witness had no formal training that would give him 
expertise in motorcycle design.186  His claim to expertise lay in his nine-year 
service on the police motor squad and his investigation of hundreds of 
motorcycle accidents.187  The witness brought no methodology to bear on his 
assessment, but merely drew inferences based on his experience.188  Thus, 
his opinion was based on his application of everyday reasoning to draw 
inferences from the many similar happenings he had observed.  The trial 
court allowed this witness to testify as an expert that, based on his 
observations, he had the impression that crash bars provided effective 
protection of the rider’s leg.189  The court should have instead scrutinized 
and excluded the testimony as lay opinion.190 
Low-level experience-based experts, such as law enforcement officers 
with some experience in drug enforcement, who have been treated as experts 
in the past, are unlikely to satisfy the reliability requirement now imposed on 
expert testimony.191  While they possess an unusual knowledge base as a 
result of their experience, they apply no methodology beyond everyday 
reasoning to draw inferences from their experience, and their opinions 
 
Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42 
(discussing the unreliability of arson evidence). 
 183.  52 F.3d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 184.  Id. at 1316.  One manufacturer, Harley-Davidson, recommended against the use of crash 
bars on police motorcycles.  Id. at 1316–17.  Engineering experts had conducted tests to determine 
whether crash bars increased safety, with mixed results.  Id.  Some engineering tests suggested that 
the utility of the crash bars depended on the precise nature of the motorcycle accident.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 1316.  The court held that permitting the witness to testify as an expert was not error.  
Id. at 1317–18.  The court provided the following account of his testimony: 
Kenneth Harms, a former Miami police chief with experience on the motorcycle patrol 
and in investigating motorcycles accidents, believes that police crash guards, particularly 
those used on Harley-Davidson motorcycles, are effective in reducing injuries.  Harms 
conceded that he had no scientific or engineering expertise in motorcycle design.  Harley-
Davidson has expressly recommended against the use of crash bars on its police 
motorcycles. 
Id. at 1316. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 1317–18.  It was not clear that he had any experience with Honda motorcycles.  See id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  The experts who testified disagreed about the use of crash bars and testified that the utility of 
crash bars depended on the precise type of motorcycle crash.  Id. at 1317.  As a result, it seems 
unlikely that the court would have permitted a lay witness, however experienced, to offer an opinion 
on the safety of the motorcycle design.  See id. 
 191.  See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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should therefore be evaluated as lay opinion.  This approach will preclude 
reliance on information that has not been admitted in formulating their 
opinions; to the extent the witness has relied on information that has not 
been admitted, the witness must satisfy the reliability requirements applied 
to expert opinion.192  Their depth of experience may qualify such witnesses 
to help educate the jury, but their lack of methodology should foreclose them 
from expressing expert opinions. 
Courts have often allowed law enforcement witnesses to testify as 
experts, expressing their opinions concerning the significance of the 
defendant’s conduct or use of language.193  These witnesses rely on their 
 
 192.  See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the agent-
witness’s testimony “depended, in whole or in part, on his specialized training and experience” and 
therefore must be evaluated as expert testimony); Martinez & Arlyn-Pessin, supra note 3, at 28 
(suggesting that the amendment to Rule 701 will modify the practice of allowing a lay witness to call 
on special knowledge in forming opinions).  This Article addresses only the issues that arise when 
the witness is asked to give an opinion.  If the witness simply shares her experience or specialized 
knowledge with the jury, the problem may not arise.  For example, in United States v. Caballero, the 
defendants argued that certain prosecution witnesses should have been treated as experts even 
though they had not expressed opinions.  United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 
2002).  The defendants suggested that the witnesses were experts merely because they “presented 
specialized knowledge, and because their testimony was based on their perceptions, education, 
training and experience.”  Id.  The witnesses testified concerning INS procedures and also 
summarized the defendants’ bank accounts and files.  Id.  The court distinguished between opinion 
and other testimony and rejected the defendants’ argument, because the witnesses “expressed neither 
a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished from a statement of fact as to what they had witnessed 
during their respective careers.”  Id. at 1247; see also United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (allowing FBI financial analyst to testify as a lay witness to review and summarize 
voluminous records from the defendant’s company).  In Hamaker, the Eleventh Circuit did not view 
the witness’s testimony as calling on any expertise.  The court stated: 
To prepare for his testimony, Odom simply added and subtracted numbers from a long 
catalogue of MCC records, and then compared those numbers in a straightforward 
fashion.  As Odom himself explained at trial, while his expertise and the use of computer 
software may have made him more efficient at reviewing MCC’s records, his review 
itself was within the capacity of any reasonable lay person. 
Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1331–32.  The mere fact that the witness summarized records did not convert 
him into an expert.  Id. 
 193.  See United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that agent was 
properly allowed to testify to drug jargon); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 
2003) (discussing admissibility of expert testimony on drug operations and drug jargon); United 
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (summarizing the range of subjects on which 
prosecution experts have been permitted to testify in narcotics cases); People v. Barnes, 19 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 229, 237–40 (Ct. App. 2004) (discussing admissibility of drug profile evidence).  In Watson, the 
Third Circuit stated: 
 The courts that have considered this issue have recognized the operations of narcotics 
dealers as a proper field of expertise.  It is well-established that government agents may 
testify to the meaning of coded drug language under Fed. R. Evid. 702.  United States v. 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 
587, 590–91 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 
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experience and training to support their opinion testimony.194  They do not 
employ any reliable methodology.195  Instead, law enforcement witnesses 
 
526 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that the jargon of the narcotics trade and drug dealers’ code language are proper subjects 
of expert opinion), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060, 119 S. Ct. 1376, 143 L. Ed. 2d 535 
(1999); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United States 
v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).  In addition, “experienced 
narcotics agent[s] may testify about the significance of certain conduct or methods of 
operation to the drug distribution business, as such testimony is often helpful in assisting 
the trier of fact understand the evidence.”  United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 
(5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132, 115 S. Ct. 2011, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1995)).  Thus, the 
operations of narcotics dealers have repeatedly been found to be a suitable topic for 
expert testimony because they are not within the common knowledge of the average 
juror.  Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590–92.  Therefore, we reject Watson’s argument; 
knowledge of the operations of narcotics dealers is a proper field of expertise. 
Watson, 260 F.3d at 307. 
 194.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir. 2008) (law enforcement witness 
permitted to testify as expert because of his lengthy experience); United States v. Throckmorton, 269 
F. App’x 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that officer testified as an expert because he “brought 
the wealth of his experience as a narcotics officer to bear” and holding that agent’s opinion should 
not have been admitted in the absence of proper pretrial notice). 
 195.  See Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 74–75 (discussing credentials of law enforcement 
experts); Moreno, supra note 5, at 21–22, 33–35 (discussing lack of reliable methodology underlying 
drug jargon expert testimony).  Amstutz and Harges suggest the following questions as the gauge of 
reliable law enforcement methodology: 
[ ] To your knowledge does your department or agency subscribe to what the education in the 
field of narcotics in law enforcement suggests? 
[ ] Does your agency often conduct investigations with other local, state or federal agencies? 
[ ] Does your agency and/or the officers involved exchange current information regarding 
narcotics-related information? 
[ ] As a result does your department or agency keep current with changes in the field regarding 
narcotics-related information? 
[ ] Does your department use the suggestions and/or information from other agencies to update 
its own practices in narcotics-related matters? 
[ ] Would that information entail changes in the law? 
[ ] Would that information entail changes in the way you conduct investigations? 
[ ] As a result of the changes in procedures and/or tactics of narcotics traffickers does your 
department also change in response to current narcotics activities? 
[ ] Does your department and/or agency engage in activities and or investigations from which 
to derive input or criticism for future operations? 
[ ] Is there a school or academic facility that teaches such tactics or changes in tactics? 
[ ] What agencies are identified as the leaders in teaching narcotics-related tactics and 
techniques? 
[ ] Have you or your department received specialized training by those agencies? 
[ ] Do you often exchange information with the staff or agents of those agencies either in a 
classroom setting or field setting? 
[ ] Is that in an effort to develop a peer review of the practices currently in place? 
[ ] Has your methodology been subjected to peer review? 
[ ] Are the practices you use currently used by other experts in the area? 
[ ] Has your technique or methodology been generally accepted in the relevant community? 
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apply familiar reasoning to their experience base, and any expression of 
opinion should be scrutinized under Rule 701 as lay opinion.196 
For example, in United States v. Garcia,197 the Second Circuit 
concluded that the witness called on “specialized knowledge” when he 
testified to his opinion that the defendant was a partner in a drug 
transaction.198  The court supported its conclusion by stating that the 
 
[ ] Has your technique or methodology been derived naturally and directly out of research you 
conducted independent of this litigation, or have you developed your opinions expressly for 
purposes of testifying? 
[ ] Have you adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations than yours? 
[ ] Is your field of expertise known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion given? 
Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 96–97.  The suggested questions test the witness’s experience 
and access to pooled information, but do not target any reliable methodology. 
 196.  See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2002).  In Glenn, the trial court allowed 
a prosecution witness who had observed the defendant from some distance to testify that the bulge in 
defendant’s pants shortly before the defendant allegedly shot the victim was a gun.  Id. at 66.  The 
Second Circuit held that the testimony was not proper.  Id.  The witness lacked the personal 
observation required for lay opinion, but was also not qualified to provide expert opinion.  Id. at 67.  
The court noted that the witness “did not arrive at his conclusions through reliable principles or 
methods but through casual, sporadic observations of drug dealers over some unspecified time 
period.”  Id.  Drug identification testimony also poses a particular problem.  In some cases, lay 
witnesses have been permitted to draw on their experience with drugs to identify a questioned 
substance.  See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 464 F.3d 976, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
lay witness was properly allowed to give opinion that substance was marijuana given her experience 
with marijuana and her multi-sensory opportunity to observe the questioned substance); United 
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting lay witness to express opinion that 
substance was cocaine based on her personal experience with drugs).  Courts should proceed 
cautiously in this area.  In the absence of chemical analysis, no witness should be permitted to testify 
to a substance’s identification; instead, a witness should be restricted to the opinion that a substance 
“appeared to be” a particular substance.  An experienced lay witness cannot rationally arrive at a 
more definite opinion using everyday reasoning due to the fact that other substances may mimic 
illegal drugs.  Furthermore, training in drug related law enforcement does not qualify a law 
enforcement officer as an expert in drug identification.  Only scientific methodology can reliably and 
definitely identify a questioned substance as a particular drug. 
 197.  413 F.3d 201. 
 198.  Id. at 216–17.  In Garcia, the court summarized the basis of the witness’s testimony and 
concluded he had testified as an expert: 
 Klemick testified that his opinion as to the various conspirators’ roles was based on 
“intercepted phone conversations and research of law enforcement databases and 
surveillance.”  Focusing simply on the wire intercepts, we observe that Klemick’s review 
of these conversations was hardly that of an average person.  To highlight this very fact 
for the jury, the government specifically elicited that Klemick had reviewed thousands of 
intercepted conversations in the course of various narcotics investigations, and that he 
had had the benefit of cooperating witnesses’ insights on some of these occasions.  Based 
on this experience, certainly outside the ken of the average person, Klemick informed the 
jury that he did not expect to overhear explicit references to drugs on the intercepted 
tapes; his experience taught him that drug dealers generally used code words when 
referring to their illicit transactions. . . .  Further, based on his “training and experience,” 
Klemick knew that when targets discussed kilogram quantities of drugs, that meant they 
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witness’s reasoning process was that of a narcotics officer, not an average 
person.199  To the contrary, while the witness had a broader experiential 
background than most lay people, he employed the basic analytical approach 
of making inferences from that experience base and the observed facts.200  
Such testimony should be evaluated as lay opinion. 
In some instances, assessing the testimony as lay rather than expert 
opinion would lead to its admissibility.201  For example, in United States v. 
 
were likely acquiring drugs for distribution rather than personal use.  When he overheard 
references to dollar amounts, he could assess their significance in light of his specialized 
knowledge that the price for a kilogram of cocaine in the New York market at the 
relevant time was $20,000 to $30,000. . . .  Training and experience had further taught 
him that quality could affect where within this range cocaine was priced, as could the 
number of middlemen in the distribution chain between the foreign supplier and the New 
York purchaser. 
 In sum, when Klemick concluded from wiretaps, database information, and surveillance 
observations, that Garcia was a “partner” with Valentin in receiving cocaine from 
DeArmas, and that his responsibilities included testing the quality of the cocaine, his 
reasoning process was not that of an average person in everyday life; rather, it was that of 
a law enforcement officer with considerable specialized training and experience in 
narcotics trafficking. 
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Watson, 260 F.3d at 307–08 (permitting three 
agents to testify as experts on the basis of their experience). 
 199.  Garcia, 413 F.3d at 217. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  See, e.g., United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 662–63 (8th Cir. 2008) (experienced 
drug enforcement agent testified that cash was wrapped in Saran wrap to mask the odor to prevent 
detection by police dogs, that packages of cocaine were coated in grease to mask the smell, and that 
pieces of tinfoil had been used to smoke cocaine); United States v. Vesey, 338 F.3d 913, 916–18 
(8th Cir. 2003) (discussing admissibility of testimony from defense witness who was an experienced 
drug dealer and confidential informant).  In Spotted Elk and Vesey, the witness’s experience would 
have provided the basis for lay opinion, and his testimony should not have been assessed as expert 
testimony.  See Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641; Vesey, 338 F.3d 913; see also United States v. Lee, 339 
F. App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Lee, a government agent was permitted to testify as an expert on the 
basis of “specialized knowledge of drug distribution networks and narcotics trafficking.”  Lee, 339 
F. App’x at 158.  The court summarized the witness’s testimony as follows: 
Agent Parks testified on aspects of drug trafficking in the Philadelphia area, none of 
which are common knowledge among lay persons serving as jurors.  Among other points, 
Agent Parks testified regarding the manner in which heroin is typically packaged, 
bundled, stamped and sealed in the Philadelphia area, how many individual packets are in 
a bundle, and how those packets and bundles of packets are usually priced.  Specifically, 
Agent Parks testified that heroin typically costs between $70 and $90 dollars per gram, 
and that, based on his conversations with the DEA lab, the amount of heroin in a bag 
generally varies from .03–.05 grams, resulting in an average of .04 grams.  Agent Parks 
further testified that resellers typically purchased heroin in bundled format, as opposed to 
individual packets.  In addition, Agent Parks testified to some of the common names for 
heroin in the Philadelphia area, including “dope” and “H.”  Agent Parks also testified 
concerning the relationship between resellers and suppliers, explaining that money may 
be paid to the supplier up-front, at first, but that the reseller may be “fronted” the heroin 
once trust is established between the two. 
Id. at 159.  The defendant complained that the witness’s “expertise was merely to repeat information 
that unidentified others communicated to him.”  Id. at 158.  The defendant further pointed out that 
the witness had no methodology or claim to expertise based on personal extensive experience.  Id.  
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Oriedo,202 the trial court allowed the agent to testify based on his own 
observations that cocaine is packaged by cutting the end off a baggie and 
then twisting or tying the drug into the removed corner of the bag.203  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the testimony should have been 
evaluated as expert opinion and should have been excluded because the 
prosecution had failed to disclose it before trial.204  Instead, the court of 
appeals should have affirmed the admission of the evidence as permissible 
lay opinion.  The agent based his testimony on his personal observations and 
experience, invoked no special methodology, and testified to an opinion that 
was fairly derived using everyday reasoning.205 
Even the scholarly discussion does not get this issue right.  Academics, 
as well as courts, cite the three examples discussed below—the perfume 
smeller, the beekeeper, and the farmer—as examples of experience-based 
expert opinion.  Categorizing these witnesses as experts ascribes too much 
value to the witnesses’ experience and illustrates inappropriate deference to 
claims based on experience in the absence of methodology.  In most 
instances, these witnesses provide opinion derived through everyday 
reasoning by bringing their experience base to bear on observed facts.206  
 
The court held that the witness was properly qualified by specialized experience.  Id. at 159.  The 
court described the witness’s training and experience as follows: 
Parks, an FBI agent for over eleven years, testified that he received training in narcotics 
and drug distribution organizations, participated in over 100 narcotics investigations, over 
100 related searches, and wiretaps covering thousands of conversations concerning drug 
activity, and that he debriefed numerous drug dealers and individuals involved with drug 
distribution.  In addition, Agent Parks testified that he consulted manuals and guidelines 
issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and the FBI to stay current.  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that through such practical 
experience and training, Agent Parks gained specialized knowledge in the field of drug 
distribution networks and narcotics trafficking.  That this was Agent Parks’s first time 
testifying as an expert does not undermine those qualifications. 
Id.  The court did not address the reliability requirement of Rule 702 and did not explain how the 
witness satisfied that requirement.  A better approach would have been to assess the opinion under 
Rule 701.  The witness’s testimony could be admitted as lay opinion given the witness’s experience. 
 202.  498 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 203.  Id. at 602–03. 
 204.  Id. at 604. 
 205.  See also United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing a law 
enforcement witness whose opinions were based on what he had seen and not what he had been 
told).  In Lopez, the court should have concluded that the investigator’s opinion was admissible lay 
opinion, provided he could cite sufficient instances in which he observed similar paraphernalia being 
used in drug distribution. 
 206.  See also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 191, 233–36 (2003) (discussing example of “gestalt expert” who testifies to the value of 
property based only on a combination of experience and a visit to the property).  Like the other 
examples, this gestalt expert is better viewed as an experienced lay witness who assesses value based 
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Their testimony should be evaluated as lay opinion, scrutinized accordingly, 
and excluded unless the court determines that the witness’s experience 
supports the opinion through the application of everyday reasoning. 
 
The perfume smeller: Some have suggested that a witness who has deep 
experience as a perfume smeller should be permitted to provide an expert 
opinion.207  Instead, the witness is an example of a lay witness with unusual 
experience.  The witness does not draw on any broad field of research, 
collective knowledge, or specialized method of analysis.  To the contrary, 
the claimed basis for the ability to form an opinion is the witness’s personal 
experience of olfactory observation, a store of similar happenings.  The court 
should decide whether the witness’s particular experience base and the 
witness’s sniffing of the scent in question permits the witness to form a 
rationally based opinion as to the identity of the questioned scent.208 
 
The beekeeper: The beekeeper has also been cited as a witness whose 
experience would support the expert opinion that bees always take off into 
the wind.209  The beekeeper’s claim to expertise is based on his extensive 
 
on similar and dissimilar properties.  The witness should be able to explain the points of similarity 
and difference to demonstrate how the other properties’ prices lead to the opinion concerning the 
value of the property in question. 
 207.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999) (referring to the perfume 
sniffer expert); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 484–85 (discussing perfume sniffer 
example); Crump, supra note 157, at 15.  Crump also cites a garage mechanic’s testimony 
concerning the price of repairs.  Crump, supra note 157, at 15. 
 208.  Interestingly, there is reliable methodology that could substitute for the sniffer’s experience-
based identification of the smell.  See Raffi Khatchadourian, Annals of Science: The Taste Makers, 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 2009, at 85 (discussing experienced tasters and smellers and a scientific 
means of assessing smells through the use of a Virtual Aroma Synthesizer, which chemically 
analyzes scents).  Another example of the use of smell to form an opinion can be found in cases in 
which police officers testify that they recognized the scent of burning marijuana.  To establish the 
foundation for that opinion, the officer, sometimes visibly uncomfortable, must establish familiarity 
with the scent.  The officer may testify, for example, that the police periodically burn seized 
marijuana so they will recognize the scent.  This testimony establishes that the officer has a 
sufficient experience base to express a lay opinion on the question, but does not demonstrate 
expertise. 
 209.  For example, in Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349–50 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth 
Circuit explained: 
 The distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony is a critical one.  
By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, 
an aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness.  Since flight principles have some 
universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee.  
Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified to testify, 
as long as he was familiar with its component parts. 
 On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the 
wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness 
if a proper foundation were laid for his conclusions.  The foundation would not relate to 
his formal training, but to his firsthand observations.  In other words, the beekeeper does 
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experience observing bees.  Unless the beekeeper brings reliable 
methodology to bear on the question of whether bees always take off into the 
wind, the beekeeper’s opinion should be governed by the lay opinion rule.  
The court should determine whether the beekeeper’s experience includes 
enough observations of bees taking off in varying conditions to reasonably 
draw the conclusion.  The court should scrutinize the opinion, recognizing 
that the testimony is based on anecdotal, impressionistic observation and 
may also be influenced by beekeeper lore—the possibly inaccurate shared 
belief that bees always take off into the wind. 
An expert opinion concerning these flight patterns must be derived 
through reliable methodology.  To bring such methodology to bear on bee 
behavior to determine whether bees always take off into the wind, 
researchers could subject bees to systematic observation.210  Bee takeoffs 
into the wind and not into the wind could be counted and analyzed.  If only 
into-the-wind takeoffs were observed, statistical analysis could assess the 
likelihood that the observations were the result of chance.211  The resulting 
data would support an expert opinion. 
 
The farmer: The farmer who offers an opinion concerning the most 
effective methods of shoring an irrigation ditch or the effectiveness of 
specific fertilizers has also been advanced as an example of an experience-
based expert.212  Like those discussed above, this witness should be treated 
as a lay witness testifying based on unusual personal experience. 
 
not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more 
bumblebees than they have. 
See also United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing beekeeper example and 
quoting Berry to explain why handwriting witness should be permitted to give expert opinion); 
Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 480 (discussing beekeeper as example of “connoisseur 
testimony”). 
 210.  Hives and bees in locations away from the hive could be filmed over a period of time and in 
a variety of conditions. 
 211.  See Moreno, supra note 5, at 33–35 (suggesting how methodology could be applied to drug 
jargon testimony). 
 212.  Professor Imwinkelried, asking whether a witness should be permitted to testify to an 
opinion based on “a ‘few’ instances of supporting experience,” turns to the example of a farmer 
offering testimony concerning fertilizer.  Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2290–91.  
He concludes that a farmer, offering the expert opinion “that a particular chemical compound is one 
of the effective fertilizers for a particular crop” in the county, should be permitted to testify even if 
he has only a few confirming experiences.  Id. at 2291.  Imwinkelried bases his conclusion in part on 
the limited nature of the opinion, noting that the witness “is not claiming that the fertilizer in 
question is the only effective one or the one universally used.”  Id.; see also Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. 
Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1985) (admitting testimony of neighboring farmers who had 
experience growing corn on land similar to the defendant’s as expert testimony on the question of 
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The farmer uses everyday reasoning and does not bring any reliable 
methodology to bear.  The farmer merely applies ordinary reasoning to draw 
inferences from her experience base.  As a lay witness, the farmer should not 
be permitted to express the opinion unless her experience base—the number 
of similar and dissimilar events the farmer has observed—is sufficient to 
give rational support to the opinion.  The court should assure itself that the 
combination of observed facts and experience permits the witness to draw 
the opinion using everyday reasoning.  If the witness’s experience is too 
limited, either because the farmer has observed too few relevant events or 
because the farmer’s experience base is too skewed to similar or dissimilar 
events, the court should exclude the opinion testimony. 
B. Be Skeptical of Claimed Expertise Based on Shared Experience 
Another risk when a witness offers experience-based opinion is that the 
witness will draw on information pooled by those with related experience, 
but not subjected to reliability testing.  When a witness in a field without 
methodology claims expertise based in part on “training,” the training may 
consist merely of a formal process for sharing experiences and the inferences 
drawn from those experiences.213  This pooled information, not tested for 
reliability, is inadmissible hearsay and could not be presented to the jury.  
The court should not permit the pooled information to be admitted through 
opinion testimony, either explicitly as the stated basis for the opinion or 
implicitly by presenting the opinion without elucidating the basis. 
The extrapolation of inferences by applying ordinary reasoning to 
anecdotal information is not generally permitted.214  Lay opinion must be 
based on the witness’s own experience and knowledge, not on information 
relayed from others.  Furthermore, the mere sharing of information does not 
transform the witness’s opinion from a lay opinion into an expert opinion.  
For example, suppose a witness owns and drives a particular make and 
 
yield).  The testimony would better be analyzed as lay opinion, permitting the witnesses to testify on 
the yield from defendant’s land if they had sufficient similar observations to support the opinion. 
 213.  See United States v. Lee, 339 F. App’x 153, 158–60 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding expert 
testimony by a law enforcement agent, based largely on his access to pooled information and general 
experience in the police force, and stating that in the absence of methodology, reliability focuses 
mainly on personal knowledge or experience); United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir. 
2008) (upholding the expert testimony of a law enforcement officer without reliable methodology, 
based on experience and information gained during his time as a detective investigating drug crimes, 
including information learned from other agents, as well as his own personal experience); United 
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that Rule 702 qualifications have been 
interpreted liberally, often allowing expert testimony by law enforcement officers based on training 
and experience, rather than methodology); United States v. Poulsen, 543 F. Supp. 2d 809, 810–11 
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (stating that experience-based expert testimony may satisfy the Daubert reliability 
requirement, and upholding the testimony of an FBI agent based solely on his training and 
experience, and not scientific methodology). 
 214.  See discussion of similar happenings supra Section IV.A.1. 
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model car and has felt the car pull to the left when she applies the brakes—
her personal experience base.  Suppose that she has also spoken to others 
with the same car and they have reported the same effect, and, further, that 
she has looked at online sources that report this effect.  That added 
information does not qualify her to give an expert opinion on the braking 
action.215  Moreover, the additional information is inadmissible hearsay and 
cannot inform the witness’s lay opinion.  To admit a lay opinion based on 
such pooled information would inject a possible source of unreliability that 
neither the court nor the jury could adequately assess. 
Allowing an experience-based witness who possesses no reliable 
methodology to testify as an expert and rely on pooled information generates 
an even greater risk of unreliability.  In United States v. Lee,216 the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the agent should not have been 
permitted to testify as an expert because he was simply relying on what other 
agents had told him.  The court concluded that the agent could rely on this 
pooled information if it was the type of information reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the field.217  The problem is that any group with a shared 
experience base will vouch for the practice of relying on pooled 
information—the lore of the group.218  When the court treats a witness as an 
expert because the witness has access to this pooled information, the court 
allows the witness to present the views of the group in the guise of expert 
opinion.  In this way, the witness transmits to the jury the beliefs of a group 
of self-proclaimed and possibly biased experts who employ no reliable 
method to draw inferences from their pooled information.  Not only does 
 
 215.  See United States v. Murphy, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting the 
argument that defense witness’s conversations with many marijuana growers established expertise).  
By contrast, shared information can play a key role in determining whether a law enforcement 
officer had probable cause.  See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating 
that, while pooled information is permissible testimony in probable cause challenges, it is not 
admissible at trial under Rule 701); see also Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (finding probable cause based on the information “gathered collectively” and shared by 
the police officers at the scene); Dubner v. City of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that probable cause may be established “through the collective knowledge of the officers at the 
scene”); United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that “[t]he determination of 
whether probable cause . . . exists can be based on the collective knowledge of all of the officers 
involved . . . .”). 
 216.  339 F. App’x 153. 
 217.  Id. at 157. 
 218.  For example, it is quite likely that the beekeeper or the farmer, discussed supra Section 
VI.A, has discussed the problem at hand (bees’ takeoffs or fertilizer) with other beekeepers or 
farmers.  A body of untested, but trusted, lore may have developed from this pooled information.  
See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 159, at 15, 60 (discussing the problem of a “guild-like 
group . . . who share the same beliefs and general methods”). 
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such an approach fail to ensure reliability, it actually heightens the threat of 
unreliability while clothing the witness in the mantle of specialized 
knowledge and expertise. 
This problem exists in some areas of forensic science.  A forensic 
witness’s expertise may rest on having been apprenticed by a more 
experienced expert, neither of them having grounding in a methodological 
approach.219  Arson investigators, for example, have often been permitted to 
testify as experts, even though their assessments rest on experience and 
shared “wisdom” rather than developed and reliable methodology.220  Based 
 
 219.  STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing problems of 
professional culture in the forensic sciences); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 88–91 
(demonstrating that even claims of methodology do not assure reliability and should be scrutinized); 
Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 481 (discussing some forensic expert testimony as 
examples of “connoisseur testimony”); Risinger et al., supra note 166, at 27–42 (discussing ways in 
which results of forensic analysis are skewed by observer effects).  Courts continue to accept claims 
of expertise based primarily on experience and rely on the acceptance of an opinion by similarly 
qualified experts to assure reliability.  See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 202 F. App’x 399, 401 
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding testimony of arson expert qualified through experience was properly 
admitted, noting in part that his “findings were subject to review by his co-workers and 
supervisors”). 
  Handwriting analysis is also a field where analysis presented as expert analysis is not 
supported by reliable methodology, but often seems to be the result of lore transmitted from one 
“expert” to another.  See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (pre-Kumho 
decision acknowledging that expert handwriting analysis is not supported by empirical evidence, but 
nevertheless concluding it is admissible); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a 
Proxy For Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 731 (1989); see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing 
handwriting expertise in case where expert summarized her analytical approach, but did not establish 
its reliability; concluding that trial court should have admitted testimony of critic of handwriting 
expertise).  The National Research Council of the National Academies summarized its findings on 
handwriting analysis as follows: 
The scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be strengthened.  Recent 
studies have increased our understanding of the individuality and consistency of 
handwriting and computer studies and suggest that there may be a scientific basis for 
handwriting comparison, at least in the absence of intentional obfuscation or forgery.  
Although there has been only limited research to quantify the reliability and replicability 
of the practices used by trained document examiners, the committee agrees that there may 
be some value in handwriting analysis. 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 166–67 (footnotes omitted).  Some 
handwriting witnesses also testify as experienced lay witnesses and are therefore subject to the 
limitations of the lay opinion rule.  See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 54 (cites recognition 
of skilled lay observer on handwriting recognition). 
 220.  DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 7-1.1, at 339 
(2002) (describing the process of using accepted tools and clues to determine the cause of a fire: 
“Some of these clues are derived from sound science.  Others are nothing more than a set of more or 
less shared beliefs that may or may not be true.  An opinion is then reached by these clues being 
processed through each investigator’s personal experience, beliefs and assumptions—in addition to 
or instead of any well tested model for analyzing fire evidence.” (footnotes omitted)).  The 
experience would include the observation of similar patterns at fires that the witness believed 
resulted from arson and dissimilar patterns at fires that the witness did not believe resulted from 
arson.  Explorations of whether arson expertise rests on reliable methodology have now revealed the 
speculative and unreliable nature of much expert testimony.  See id. § 7-1.2, at 343 (reporting that 
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on experience and pooled information, the witness would testify that certain 
physical evidence (burn patterns or reactions of window glass) were signs of 
arson, indicating that the fire was set and signaling where it originated.221  
The problems associated with pooled information infect arson testimony: An 
arson “expert” would erroneously conclude that a fire resulted from arson 
when it had not, and would then share the observations from the fire scene 
with other arson investigators to support the belief that certain patterns 
indicated arson—beliefs later shown to be wrong.222  The courts that allowed 
these arson investigators to testify as experts should have rejected claims of 
expertise based on shared information, and instead evaluated and excluded 
the offered testimony as lay opinion.223 
The use of pooled information that has not been tested by reliable 
methodology is likely to compound the effect of inaccurate inferential 
reasoning.  When experience-based opinions and beliefs do not pass through 
the crucible of a methodology that checks for accuracy and reliability, the 
effect of perception bias or other distorting reasoning is reinforced.  The 
 
before Kumho was decided, “some insurance company attorneys began counseling fire investigators 
to identify themselves as ‘experience-based’ experts, in an effort to avoid scrutiny under Daubert”); 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173 (discussing unreliability of arson 
expertise); Grann, supra note 182, at 42 (discussing unreliability of arson evidence). 
 221.  FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 220, § 7-1.1, at 341 (citing concrete spalling, crazed glass, and 
burn pattern testimony as having been common and having been unsupported by empirical research).  
Courts continue to accept claims of arson expertise based primarily on experience.  See, e.g., 
Santiago, 202 F. App’x 399.  In Santiago, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an expert’s testimony 
that the fire resulted from arson was properly admitted even though the witness was not a certified 
arson investigator given his experience in the field.  Id. at 401. 
 222.  The National Academy of Sciences Report states: 
Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue to make 
determinations about whether or not a particular fire was set.  However, according to 
testimony presented to the committee, many of the rules of thumb that are typically 
assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used (e.g., “alligatoring” of wood, specific 
char patterns) have been shown not to be true. 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173. 
 223.  Had the courts evaluated the opinion as lay opinion, the courts should have excluded the 
evidence, determining that the witness could not reach the offered opinions by applying lay 
reasoning to the witness’s experience base.  The witness could not know with certainty which of the 
earlier observed fire sites resulted from arson and which did not.  That missing knowledge injects a 
risk that the witness would engage in questionable reasoning and arrive at unfounded conclusions.  A 
witness reasoning from experience uninformed by reliable methodology might conclude that, 
because a particular fire pattern is present at the site of the questioned fire and was also present at the 
site of an earlier fire, which the witness believed resulted from arson, the questioned fire must also 
have resulted from arson.  If the presence of the pattern also influenced the witness to conclude that 
the first fire resulted from arson, the reasoning is circular and the basis for concluding the first fire 
was arson is flawed.  However, even if the witness knew with certainty that the earlier fire or fires 
resulted from arson, lay reasoning does not support the conclusion that a particular burn pattern at 
the earlier site suggests arson. 
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entire lore may be skewed by faulty reasoning and by the resulting 
expectations of those making the observations.224  As a result, those relying 
on the pooled information will become biased observers.225  The courts 
should recognize that a witness does not become an expert through the 
transfer of unconfirmed lore and may be more likely than a witness without 
that preconditioning to jump to unfounded conclusions. 
C. Evaluate the Fit Between the Witness’s Experience and the Opinion 
Once expertise is established, an expert witness is allowed to call on 
undisclosed pools of information gleaned from others in the field, as well as 
the expert’s own personal observations.226  The expert is not required to 
provide all the background information.  A lay witness should not be 
accorded similar latitude.  Instead, the court must consider whether the 
combination of the witness’s experience and observation of relevant facts in 
the case allows the witness to derive the proffered opinion through the 
application of everyday reasoning.227  In some cases, the witness’s 
experience base supports the lay opinion.228  In others, however, the opinion 
 
 224.  For example, a novice beekeeper will be told that bees take off only into the wind.  That will 
encourage the beekeeper to look for that phenomenon and discount anything the beekeeper observes 
to the contrary. 
 225.  In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Supreme Court explained bias as follows: 
Bias is a term used in the “common law of evidence” to describe the relationship between 
a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, 
his testimony in favor of or against a party.  Bias may be induced by a witness’s like, 
dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’s self-interest.  Proof of bias is almost always 
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically 
been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a 
witness’s testimony. 
Id. at 52. 
 226.  See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 227.  See, e.g., United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that 
officer’s testimony concerning certain aspects of narcotics trafficking was admissible lay opinion 
where the officer laid out his experience in some detail; the testimony stayed within the realm of 
inferences rationally based on the officer’s knowledge); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 
1577 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that officer was allowed to express lay opinion that burn marks on 
victim’s back “were consistent with marks that would be left by a stun gun,” an opinion rationally 
derived from his prior observations); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 220, § 7-1.3.3, at 348 
(suggesting that “[c]ourts would be well advised to unpack the claimed ‘experience’ in order to 
discover what was learned from it and whether that something supports a valid and reliable expert 
opinion”). 
 228.  See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602–04 (7th Cir. 2007) (witness provided 
opinion based on his own observations that cocaine is packaged by cutting the end off a baggie and 
then twisting or tying the drug into the removed corner of the bag; the opinion should have been 
allowed as admissible lay opinion). 
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cannot be rationally derived by bringing the witness’s experience to bear on 
the observed facts.229 
In Satcher v. Honda Motor Co.,230 discussed above, the court allowed a 
former police officer to testify to an expert opinion concerning the efficacy 
of crash bars on police motorcycles.231  The witness drew on his experience 
serving on the police motor squad and his investigation of hundreds of 
motorcycle accidents.232  His opinion was based on his application of 
everyday reasoning to draw inferences from the other motorcycle 
accidents—other happenings—he had observed.  The court should have 
evaluated his testimony as lay opinion and should also have determined the 
similarity or dissimilarity of the circumstances in those other accidents.  
Without that inquiry, the court had no assurance that the opinion was 
rationally based on the witness’s experience and the observed facts. 
In United States v. Maher,233 the court allowed the prosecution to 
present lay opinion from a law enforcement officer that, based on his 
training and experience, the Post-It note found in the defendant’s van was a 
“drug note[],” or a “[d]rug distributor’s way of being organized.”234  The 
court should have been more exacting.  First, the opinion was not supported 
by any demonstration that the officer had sufficient experience with similar 
uses of Post-It notes to support his opinion.235  Without that information, the 
 
 229.  See, e.g., id.  In Oriedo, the Seventh Circuit approved the trial court’s decision to admit as 
lay opinion the testimony of an agent who testified that he was “personally concerned about there 
being two vehicles” because “more than one vehicle . . . raises concerns about” counter-surveillance.  
Id. at 602.  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the witness’s testimony involved only lay opinion 
because the agent did not testify about counter-surveillance practices in the drug trade or 
characterize what he saw as counter-surveillance.  Id.  In Oriedo, the opinion should not have been 
admitted without a demonstration that the agent had an adequate basis in personal observation to 
support the opinion.  The court noted that the agent only testified to “his own state of mind while 
observing this particular drug deal.”  Id.  Of course, the greatest problem with this testimony is that 
the agent’s state of mind was entirely irrelevant in the jury trial, but the court did not address that 
concern.  This may represent an example of a court not differentiating between evidence relevant to 
a Fourth Amendment question, but not relevant to the question of guilt or innocence.  The agent’s 
state of mind could contribute to probable cause, but was not relevant at the defendant’s trial. 
 230.  52 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 231.  Id. at 1316–18. 
 232.  Id. at 1317–18. 
 233.  454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 234.  Id. at 24. 
 235.  To be admitted as lay opinion, the officer’s opinion must be extrapolated from similar events 
in his experience base, but the prosecution did not elicit testimony establishing that similar events 
existed.  The opinion testimony constituted a shortcut for evidence of similar events—instances in 
which such notes had been found and had been shown to be drug records—and the connection of 
those events to the defendant’s case through the officer’s opinion.  If this aspect of the prosecution’s 
case were unpacked, the trial court would have to go through a much more careful analysis.  First, 
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court could not ensure compliance with the requirement that the opinion be 
rationally based on the witness’s perception.236  Furthermore, the manner in 
which it was presented gave the jurors no basis for independent assessment 
and invited them merely to defer to the superior knowledge of the officer. 
D. Limit Opinion Based on Third Party Conduct 
The use of third party conduct to form the opinion that a defendant acted 
in a way that was typical of particular criminal activity is a recurrent 
problem in the testimony of law enforcement witnesses.237  Experience-
based law enforcement opinion witnesses often testify to inferences based on 
third party conduct.  The prosecution uses these opinion witnesses to paint 
the defendant with the criminality of others they have investigated.  The 
witness accomplishes this goal either by testifying that the defendant’s 
apparently innocent conduct is actually criminal behavior because the 
witness has seen other criminals behave in the same way or that the 
defendant’s criminal behavior has particular significance not otherwise 
apparent to the jury.  In this manner, law enforcement witnesses have 
labeled using Post-It notes,238 riding a bicycle around the neighborhood,239 
and driving a rental car as conduct that signals involvement in drug 
 
the prosecution would present evidence of the similar events—instances observed by this particular 
officer (not recounted to him by others) and sufficiently similar to be probative; the court would 
have to determine that these other instances cleared the hurdle of basic relevance under Rule 402 and 
also had sufficient probative value to avoid exclusion under Rule 403 as being unfairly prejudicial.  
Second, the court would have to determine that the officer’s opinion reflected a rational inference 
from this pool of data and was helpful to the jury, even though the jury was now armed with as much 
information as the officer.  The claim that the officer participated in numerous drug cases should not 
be allowed to substitute for more specific information about the officer’s particular basis of 
knowledge concerning the use of drug notes. 
 236.  See also United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  In Williams, without 
examining the basis for the officer’s opinion, the trial court permitted a patrol officer to testify as an 
expert that drug users commonly carry guns for protection.  Id. at 1306.  When the court of appeals 
examined the basis for the opinion, the court concluded that the witness had been involved in fewer 
than twelve arrests involving firearm possession, not enough to support his opinion testimony.  Id. at 
1309.  The court also concluded that the foundation was insufficient to support a lay opinion on the 
issue.  Id. at 1309–10.  But see United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 847 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing 
defendant’s argument that agent should not be permitted to testify about the connection between 
firearms and drug trafficking because he had no experience with drugs and licensed firearms). 
 237.  See generally Peter Schofield, Comment, Criteria for Admissibility of Expert Opinion 
Testimony on Criminal Modus Operandi, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 547 (discussing the use of testimony 
concerning typical modus operandi to convince the jury that defendant’s conduct was criminal). 
 238.  See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States v. 
Throckmorton, 269 F. App’x 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing admissibility of officer’s testimony 
about narcotics “owe-sheets”). 
 239.  See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 744–45 (6th Cir. 2006) (allowing 
prosecution’s fact witnesses to testify as expert witnesses and opine that the defendant was 
conducting counter-surveillance when he left home on his bicycle, and that scraps of paper contained 
notes related to drug transactions). 
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dealing.240  To invite the jury to connect weapon possession with drug-
dealing, officers have testified that drug dealers commonly carry guns for 
protection.241  The courts must ensure that these opinions do not reflect 
unwarranted inferences of criminality drawn by biased witnesses. 
The courts should also guard against the prejudicial impact of having a 
witness attach criminal significance to the defendant’s otherwise innocent 
conduct by characterizing it as a modus operandi typical of a particular type 
of crime.  Consider, for instance, the law enforcement expert’s testimony 
that a defendant’s use of a rental car signaled that defendant was an 
experienced narcotics trafficker.242  The opinion rests on the inference that, 
because some other drug traffickers act this way, the defendant’s action 
marks him as a drug trafficker as well.  The court should not give this 
evidence a role in the defendant’s case.  Generally, it is not permissible to 
invite the jury to draw an inference about this defendant based on the 
conduct of an unrelated third party.  If the prosecution simply offered 
evidence that a different defendant in a different case used a rented car, it 
would be inadmissible because it lacks probative value and injects too much 
risk of unfair prejudice.243  If the court admits this lay opinion, the court 
accepts the agent-witness’s conclusion that it has happened often enough to 
be a drug trafficking practice.  But neither the court nor the agent is in a 
position to draw that inference.  The agent’s opinion is suspect because the 
agent’s sample of observation is skewed to include a disproportionate 
number of drug transactions, leaving the agent unable to assess the use of 
 
 240.  United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United 
States v. Millbrook, 553 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing agent to testify as an expert 
that drug users pay in small bills, in order to explain defendant’s possession of $1000 in cash and 
refute his claim that he was going to use it to pay an $800 utility bill), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jeanetta, 533 F.3d 651 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (allowing expert law enforcement witness to testify that Ziploc bags, radios, scanners, 
cameras, monitors, night vision goggles and large quantities of cash were all associated with drug 
dealing); United States v. Martinez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 688, 690 (9th Cir. 2007) (agent testified 
that having air freshener and only one or two keys in a vehicle signaled that it was transporting 
drugs). 
 241.  See United States v. Farrish, 297 F. App’x 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing the government’s 
evidence that drug dealers commonly carry guns as support for defendant’s conviction); United 
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “drug dealers frequently carry 
weapons”); see also Williams, 212 F.3d at 1309–10 (holding patrol officer did not have enough 
experience to testify to the opinion that drug users commonly carry guns for protection). 
 242.  Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1243–44; see also Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay 
Witnesses, supra note 3, at 3, 34 (discussing Figueroa-Lopez). 
 243.  See supra Section IV.A.3. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:30 PM 
 
614 
rental cars in the general population.  Moreover, the agent is a biased 
observer, watching for signs of narcotics trafficking.244 
The government’s use of the drug courier profile also illustrates the risk 
of such testimony.  When admitted as proof of guilt, the witness testifying to 
the drug courier profile is allowed to list the aspects of the defendant’s 
behavior that typify drug courier behavior.245  The witness is permitted to 
opine, and the jury is invited to infer, that the defendant is guilty because the 
defendant shares these behaviors with others who have committed drug 
offenses.246  Courts have recognized that such testimony injects a substantial 
risk of unfair prejudice and is generally improper.247  The courts should 
extend that cautious approach to other similar uses of third party conduct. 
 
 244.  The opinion should also be excluded as expert opinion.  Nothing assures the reliability of the 
conclusion.  The agent does not employ a reliable methodology to ensure that she does not ascribe 
unwarranted significance to innocent behavior and act as a biased witness who may not reliably 
decide the fair probative value of the instances of similar conduct in other criminal transactions.  
Although the Advisory Committee acknowledged these types of law enforcement experts when Rule 
702 was amended to reflect Daubert’s emphasis on reliability, the Committee did not explain how 
the process employed by the agent differs from lay reasoning applied to a deep experience base and 
satisfies the requirement of reliable methodology: 
For example, when a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a 
drug transaction, the principle used by the agent is that participants in such transactions 
regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities.  The method used by the 
agent is the application of extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the 
conversations.  So long as the principles and methods are reliable and applied reliably to 
the facts of the case, this type of testimony should be admitted. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 245.  See, e.g., United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).  In Lui, the trial court permitted 
an agent to testify that the defendant showed five characteristics of a drug courier: 
(1) [A]lthough “heroin couriers have a hundred ways to smuggle heroin,” typically they 
wrap it around their bodies or place it in false bottoms and tops of suitcases; (2) in 
approximately 80 percent of smuggling cases, couriers use hard-sided suitcases; (3) 
couriers often use the excuse of conducting business or visiting a relative in the United 
States; (4) couriers create itineraries with multiple stops for short periods of time so as to 
enter the United States from a “non-source” country to avoid detection; and (5) couriers 
often use paging devices. 
Id. at 846. 
 246.  It has been noted that the profile can be adapted to fit almost any traveler.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the court has long been critical of 
drug courier profiles); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that “[d]rug courier profiles are 
inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for including innocent citizens as profiled 
drug couriers”).  The profile is more appropriately used as a test for reasonable suspicion to justify a 
search or seizure than as an indicator of guilt at trial.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 
(1996) (drug courier profile information went towards forming reasonable suspicion); United States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (allowing drug courier information to form reasonable suspicion for 
investigative stop); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).  But see United States v. 
Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (cautioning against using profile generalizations to 
establish reasonable suspicion). 
 247.  See United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662–63 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
admission of agent’s testimony concerning modus operandi of drug dealers was error); United States 
v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 176–77 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding it was error to permit an agent to testify 
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The courts should not defer to government claims that a witness, 
whether expert or lay, is drawing fair inferences from the conduct of others.  
Instead, the court should scrutinize the opinion.  The court should not permit 
the inference unless the party offering the opinion provides information 
concerning base rates—how frequently or infrequently the same conduct 
occurs in innocent contexts.248  For example, the fact that packages of drugs 
are frequently wrapped in duct tape may be helpful when trying to determine 
the contents of a package wrapped in duct tape, but it does not support the 
inference that possession of duct tape signals drug dealing.  The base rate 
undermines the inference: many who do not distribute drugs possess duct 
tape.  Without base rate information, the court should recognize the risk that 
the opinion witness is presenting an unfounded inference, skewed by the 
observer’s bias, and only rarely admit opinion testimony based on third party 
conduct. 
E. Prohibit Over-Claiming 
The courts should prohibit experience-based witnesses from drawing 
broad conclusions from the observed facts.249  The cases illustrate efforts to 
push opinion testimony past any reasonable limit.250 
 
“that crack dealers often sell crack in small quantities and keep the proceeds from the sales nearby 
rather than in a bank” and “that crack dealers normally possess firearms and that crack users can be 
distinguished from dealers by the amount of the drug that each keeps on hand”); United States v. 
Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding profile evidence should not have been 
admitted).  The courts permit the use of drug courier profile testimony at trial to provide background 
explaining why the defendant was stopped or arrested or to rebut certain defense claims.  See United 
States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, 507 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2007) (allowing agent’s testimony because it 
was not precisely profile testimony and it served to rebut defendant’s claims of innocence); United 
States v. Urbina, 431 F.3d 305, 311–12 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing profile evidence to rebut 
defendant’s claim that he was unaware of drugs in gas tank); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 
1208, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing profile evidence to rebut defendant’s claim he was too poor 
to be a courier). 
 248.  STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 112. 
 249.  See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2007) (approving admission of  
agent’s testimony that he was “personally concerned about there being two vehicles” because “more 
than one vehicle . . . raises concerns about . . . countersurveillance”); United States v. Grinage, 390 
F.3d 746, 747–50 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that trial court improperly permitted agent to provide 
opinions based on his investigation and the content of 2000 recorded phone conversations describing 
the criminal organization and the roles of various participants). 
 250.  See, e.g., United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011) (condemning use of an agent to 
give broad overview of criminal case); Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1001–06 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial court properly excluded testimony about the tendency of Korean 
businessmen to circumvent currency regulations and the ways in which they did so); Trevino v. 
Rock Island Police Dept., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206–08 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (reporting that plaintiff 
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When agents are accepted as experts, they are sometimes permitted to 
state quite broad opinions concerning the criminal character of a defendant’s 
conduct.251  In United States v. Brown,252 for example, the courts allowed 
law enforcement experts to opine that a particular apartment was used for 
storing drugs, that the defendant’s stop at the house was “consistent with . . . 
a drug delivery,” that the defendant had control over the apartment, and that 
the defendant’s actions “were consistent with that of someone engaging in 
counter-surveillance activities and attempting to destroy evidence.”253  In 
this way, the prosecution used its expert witnesses to endorse the inferences 
the prosecution hoped to persuade the jury to draw.254  These inferences 
should be the subject of argument rather than testimony.255 
Even when a witness testifies to lay opinion, the party offering the 
testimony may push the witness to over-claim.  In United States v. Garcia, 
for example, the prosecution presented the case agent at trial as a lay witness 
to introduce the case by describing the roles played in the drug conspiracy 
by the various defendants, and the trial court allowed the testimony.256  This 
 
wanted to use monocular police officer to testify to broad assertions about the performance of 
monocular officers based only on his own experience). 
 251.  See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
prosecution expert strayed from his expertise when he stated opinion concerning what defendant 
meant by particular statement); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that trial court had improperly permitted expert to provide opinion testimony outside the 
scope of his expertise). 
 252.  110 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 253.  Id. at 610. 
 254.  See also United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 744–45 (6th Cir. 2006).  In Lopez-
Medina, the prosecution’s fact witnesses also served as expert witnesses and stated opinions 
concerning the criminal character of defendant’s conduct.  Id. at 743.  The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the trial court did not sufficiently inform the jury on the demarcation between the expert opinion 
and the fact testimony, but did not condemn the opinion testimony.  Id. at 745.  The prosecution sees 
such value in this testimony that it sometimes offers expert testimony on criminal behavior when it is 
not relevant to the particular case.  See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (concluding that agent’s testimony on drug trafficking was not relevant to the case against 
the defendant and noting that the government reported that it routinely introduces such testimony in 
all drug cases). 
 255.  See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008) (prosecution expert testified 
that no one who was not involved with the drug deal would be present at the deal); United States v. 
Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758–60 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that agent properly testified to expert opinion 
that defendant’s otherwise innocent behavior looking up and down the street constituted counter-
surveillance). 
 256.  413 F.3d 201, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2005) (recounting agent’s testimony).  On appeal, the 
government argued unsuccessfully that “a case agent may offer, at the beginning of a trial, a lay 
opinion providing a summary overview of anticipated evidence.”  Id. at 211.  The Second Circuit 
condemned this practice, but concluded it was harmless error and upheld the conviction.  The court 
stated: “Klemick’s opinion did more than provide a ‘summary’ of Garcia’s words and actions—by 
whomever they were observed.  It told the jury that Klemick, an experienced DEA agent, had 
determined, based on the total investigation of the charged crimes, that Garcia was a culpable 
member of the conspiracy.”  Id. at 213.  The court further noted: 
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testimony should have been disallowed; the agent’s biased conclusions about 
the defendants’ criminality went beyond helpful lay opinion and injected 
substantial prejudice into the case. 
When a witness states an experience-based opinion, even if the court 
admits it as lay opinion, the proponent may present the witness and the 
opinion in a way that suggests expertise.  For example, when a law 
enforcement witness provides a lay opinion, the prosecution may emphasize 
that the opinion is based on experience and training, as well as participation 
in other narcotics cases, thus clothing the opinion in the appearance of 
expertise.257  The trial court should prohibit such bolstering while the 
witness is testifying, as well as during closing argument. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The classification of experience-based testimony as either lay or expert 
is critical to its admissibility.  However, the line demarking the categories is 
difficult to determine, and courts do not always strike the proper balance.  
Too often, witnesses with unusual or rich experience bases are permitted to 
testify as experts despite employing no reliable methodology or analysis.  
Absent such methodology, witnesses offering experience-based testimony 
merely apply ordinary lay reasoning to their experience base.  Such 
everyday reasoning does not meet the reliability standard required of expert 
testimony.  Experience alone often fails to sharpen a witness’s reasoning 
process and may sometimes deepen the witness’s bias.  Thus, only witnesses 
 
[T]his practice is particularly problematic in criminal cases because it allows “the 
government to paint a picture of guilt before the [supporting] evidence has been 
introduced.”  We . . . condemn the practice of having a case agent offer a summary 
opinion as to culpability before any evidence to support such a conclusion has been 
presented for jury review. 
Id. at 214; see Bigelow, supra note 3, at 5–8 (discussing prosecution use of summary witnesses). 
 257.  See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing as lay opinion 
agent’s testimony, conveying a veiled claim of expertise, that based on his experience and training, 
he could tell when there was counter-surveillance and that he observed counter-surveillance in the 
defendant’s case); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (opinion witness provided 
no specific basis in past experience for reaching conclusion that Post-It notes were a “[d]rug 
distributors’ way of being organized,” but alluded to his experience and training, thus suggesting that 
the opinion rested on expert knowledge).  In Maher, the agents’ search had yielded a large roll of 
currency and approximately half a gram of heroin in the defendant’s pocket, and, in the van, a bag 
which contained three sandwich bags of cocaine, a scale, and a Post-It note listing several names, 
each with a number to the right.  Maher, 454 F.3d at 17.  Given this evidence, it is hard to 
understand why the prosecution felt the need to elicit the officer’s opinion concerning the nature of 
the Post-it note. 
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who use reliable methodology to form their opinions should be permitted to 
testify as experts. 
Witnesses who derive their opinions by applying everyday reasoning to 
their personal experiences should be treated as lay witnesses.  Rule 701 
provides the appropriate framework for scrutinizing experience-based 
opinion testimony.  The rule directs the court to ensure that the opinion is 
rationally derived from facts perceived by the witness.  The court should 
assess the reasonableness of the witness’s inferences given the witness’s 
experience and the facts known to the witness.  Thus, the classification of 
experience-based testimony as lay testimony will keep courts from 
attributing inappropriate value and deference to such testimony. 
Further, courts should apply Rule 701 with bite.  Rather than accepting 
at face value a witness’s claims based on training or shared experiences, 
courts should recognize that groups sometimes subscribe to a set of shared, 
but nonetheless unreliable, beliefs.  Courts should also scrutinize whether 
the witness’s experience base is sufficiently extensive to support the opinion, 
limit the extent to which opinion testimony may be based on the conduct of 
unrelated third parties, and insist that the witness refrain from over-claiming 
by suggesting that a lay opinion rests on expertise or by drawing over-broad 
inferences from the witness’s experience.  By giving teeth to the lay opinion 
rule, courts can avoid admitting opinion testimony that lacks a sufficient 
basis and ensure that only reliable inferences fairly drawn from experience 
are presented to the jury. 
 
